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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In December 2014, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) made waves among international criminal law scholars 
and practitioners.1 In her briefing to the United Nations Security 
Council (the UN Security Council or Council), Prosecutor Bensouda 
proclaimed that she would suspend the ten-year-long investigation 
and five-year-long outstanding warrant against the Sudan’s Presi-
dent Al-Bashir,2 stating:  
[G]iven the Council’s lack of foresight on what should happen in 
Darfur, I am left with no choice but to put investigative activities 
in Darfur on hold as I shift resources to other urgent cases, espe-
cially those where trial is approaching. It should thus be clear to 
the Council that unless there is a change of attitude and ap-
proach to Darfur in the near future, there will continue to be lit-
tle or nothing to report to it for the foreseeable future.3   
 It is rare for any Prosecutor to publicly announce that she is no 
longer actively investigating an open case or seeking jurisdiction 
over a high-profile indictee, while at the same time leaving charges 
pending. The Prosecutor of the ICC’s unprecedented confrontation 
of the Council highlighted a critical juncture in the ongoing rela-
tionship between the political and powerful Council and the inde-
pendent Office of the Prosecutor. Yet, the Prosecutor did not main-
tain this stance for long. In her June 2015 briefing, the Prosecutor 
“clarified” these remarks by stating that she is not halting proceed-
ings against Al-Bashir, she is merely devoting more resources to 
other areas.4 Her posturing, nonetheless, shines a light on the po-
tential for the ICC to delay or simply say no to the powerful UN Se-
curity Council’s referrals in the future, while at the same time 
demonstrating the limits of this strategy.  
                                                                                                                  
 1. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, OTP Suspends Darfur Investigation, OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 
12, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/12/12/otp-suspends-darfur-investigation/ 
[https://perma.cc/PZ82-N5NM]. 
 2. See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7337th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7337 (Dec. 12, 
2014) (“It is becoming increasingly difficult for me to appear before the Council to update it 
when all I am doing is repeating the same things I have said over and over again, most of 
which are well known to the Council . . . . To date, none of those individuals have been 
brought to justice, and some of them continue to be implicated in atrocities committed 
against innocent civilians . . . . I remain open to constructively engage with the Council on 
the Darfur issue. What is needed is a dramatic shift in the Council’s approach to arresting 
Darfur suspects.”). 
 3. Id. at 2. 
 4. U.N. SCOR, 70th Sess., 7478th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7478 (June 29, 2015). 
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 In its fifteenth year of operations, the ICC continues to be 
plagued by criticism about its effectiveness.5 Perceived bias of the 
ICC, to the extent that Rome Statute6 States Parties’ protests are 
sincere, has damaged States Parties’ understandings of the inde-
pendence and fairness of the ICC. In January 2016, the African Un-
ion (AU) recommended that its Open-Ended Committee of African 
Ministers on the ICC consider a roadmap on possible withdrawal 
from the ICC.7 Burundi8 recently withdrew from the ICC. In addi-
tion, as this Article goes to print, Gambia9 and South Africa10 have 
both withdrawn from, and more recently, rejoined the ICC.11 Corre-
                                                                                                                  
 5. See generally Joseph M. Isanga, The International Criminal Court Ten Years 
Later: Appraisal and Prospects, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 241 (2013) (describ-
ing the ICC’s achievements over its first ten years as well as potential issues related to the 
Rome Statute, the Security Council, and the ICC’s relationship with non-parties like the 
United States).  
 6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 7. Elise Keppler, Dispatches: On Africa and the ICC, Don’t Buy All the Hype, HUM. 
RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 1, 2016, 10:30 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/01/dispatches-
africa-and-icc-dont-buy-all-hype [https://perma.cc/PU3N-5445] (“But the decision is not a 
call for mass withdrawal, nor is it the first time withdrawal has been raised but not mate-
rialized.”). In 2011, the African Union proposed an unsuccessful amendment to the Rome 
Statute that would permit States to request the Council to defer pending matters, and 
absent a reply from the Council within six months, allow the General Assembly to do so. 
Amendments To Be Considered at the Ninth Session of the Assembly, ASP NEWSL. 
(ICC/Assembly of States Parties), Jan. 2010, at 6; African Union [AU], Progress Report of 
the Commission on the Implementation of the Decisions of the Assembly of the African 
Union on the International Criminal Court, EX.CL/952(XXVIII) (Jan. 23–28, 2016), 
http://www.jfjustice.net/userfiles/file/ICC%20Report%20on%20progress%202016%2001ICC% 
20EX%20CL%20952%20(XXVIII)%20_E%20(1).PDF. As this Article goes to press, South 
Africa, Gambia, and Burundi announced plans to withdraw from the ICC. Elise Keppler, 
African Members Reaffirm Support at International Criminal Court Meeting, HUM. RIGHTS 
WATCH (Nov. 17, 2016, 6:37 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/17/african-members-
reaffirm-support-international-criminal-court-meeting [https://perma.cc/2EBH-WTKT].  
 8. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Burundi: Withdrawal, 
C.N.805.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 28, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
CN/2016/CN.805.2016-Eng.pdf. 
 9. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Gambia: Withdrawal, 
C.N.862.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Nov. 11, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
CN/2016/CN.862.2016-Eng.pdf; U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Gambia: 
Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal, C.N.62.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10  
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/CN.62.2017-Eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y7EJ-P4UJ]. 
 10. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, South Africa: Withdrawal, 
C.N.786.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 25, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
CN/2016/CN.786.2016-Eng.pdf; U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, South 
Africa: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal, C.N.121.2017. TREATIES-XVIII.10 
(Mar. 7, 2017), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/CN.121.2017-Eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6HEL-TLWS]. 
 11. See Jake Flanagin, South Africa Is Withdrawing from the International Criminal 
Court, QUARTZ AFR. (Oct. 11, 2015), http://qz.com/521724/south-africa-is-withdrawing-
from-the-international-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/7756-EBMZ]; Jacey Fortin, The 
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spondingly, supporters of the ICC worry about its longevity and 
many have curtailed their expectations of the ICC’s potential.12 One 
of the ICC’s many challenges is its relationship with the most pow-
erful organ of the United Nations system, the UN Security Council. 
The UN Security Council, with its three permanent, veto-wielding 
members that are not States Parties to the Rome Statute, has not 
consistently supported the ICC, even after it referred challenging 
cases to the ICC. These cases are distinguishable from others as 
they involve States that are not parties to the Rome Statute. The 
Council’s lack of consistent support for, and importantly, its mem-
bers’ active undermining of, the ICC’s work has affected the ICC’s 
capacity to effectively,13 and meaningfully,14 investigate and prose-
cute Council-referred situations.  
                                                                                                                  
Continent Versus the Court: African Union Deliberates Withdrawal from the ICC, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/continent-versus-court-
african-union-deliberates-withdrawal-icc-1422434; Mark Kersten, Sudan, South Africa and 
the Future of the International Criminal Court in Africa, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/13/sudan-south-africa- 
and-the-future-of-the-international-criminal-court-in-africa/; Michael Pizzi, South Africa 
Threatens to Withdraw from ICC, Alleging Anti-African Bias, ALJAZEERA AM. (Oct. 12, 
2015, 3:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/12/south-africa-threatens-to-
withdraw-from-icc-alleging-anti-african-bias.html [https://perma.cc/JWU7-D93D]. This 
Article does not attempt to predict the likelihood that the AU will withdraw from the Rome 
Statute, but instead treats the possibility as real. Articles on this subject exist elsewhere. 
See, e.g., AU Members States Could Withdraw from ICC, ENEWS CHANNEL AFR. (June 15, 
2015, 7:01 PM), http://www.enca.com/africa/au-members-states-could-withdraw-icc 
[https://perma.cc/4XKQ-X58Z]; ICTJ Deplores ANC Resolution to Lead Africa-Wide With-
drawal from ICC, SABC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2015, 20:58), http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/ 
080bb3804a322a0bafbbefa53d9712f0/ICTJ-deplores-ANC-resolution-to-lead-Africa-wide-
withdrawal-from-ICC-20151310; Kenya Parliament Votes to Withdraw from ICC, 
ALJAZEERA (Sept. 5, 2013, 21:20), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/09/ 
201395151027359326.html [https://perma.cc/WNM8-NR4K]; Leaders Renew Calls for Ken-
ya to Withdraw from Rome Statute, DAILY NATION (Sept. 6, 2015), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Leaders-renew-calls-for-Kenya-to-withdraw-from-
Rome-Statute/-/1064/2860688/-/enilx9/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/9GEG-PSWP]. 
 12. See, e.g., Trevor Sutton, John Norris, & Carolyn Kenney, Preserving International 
Justice in the Age of Donald Trump, CTR. FOR AM. PROGESS, (Jan. 23, 2017, 9:02 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/01/23/296975/preserving-
international-justice-in-the-age-of-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/MGF2-RDZ8] (“While 
international justice has made a quantum leap over the past 25 years, it has been a highly 
uneven and sometimes troubled journey. . . . Today, the future of international criminal 
justice is more in doubt than at any point since the end of the Cold War.”). 
 13. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully explore the many possible definitions 
of effectiveness. This Article’s definition of effectiveness is unpacked further in Part IV. 
Rather, for purposes of this Article, I adopt an understanding of goal-oriented effectiveness, 
centering on the goals of the Rome Statute’s mandate holders. These goals are not merely 
primary norm compliance and dispute resolution, but also regime support, and regime 
legitimization, with tradeoffs between each and strengths in various areas. For such a def-
inition, see Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-
Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 226 (2012) (asking, “Are international courts ef-
fective tools for international governance?”). See also James F. Alexander, The Interna-
tional Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 
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 The ICC is an independent tribunal,15 charged by its mandate 
holders, States Parties, to prosecute “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.”16 Despite the 
ICC’s formal autonomy, however, its founding treaty, the Rome 
Statute, permits the powerful and political UN Security Council, 
inter alia, to refer situations to the ICC, including those in non-
State Parties, and to defer the ICC’s ongoing proceedings.17  
 Conventional wisdom would suggest that the relatively power-
less ICC should cooperate with the Council, and that the Council 
should refer cases of massive atrocities, such as the situation in 
Syria to the ICC.18 A key concern underpinning this position is that 
                                                                                                                  
VILL. L. REV. 1 (2009); Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: 
Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2009); 
Antonio Cassese, Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 434, 
441 (2006); Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2008).  
 14. This Article assumes that effectiveness consists of more than just successful pros-
ecutions. As Shany’s conception acknowledges, courts can make meaningful contributions 
to longer-term, systemic effects on the development and legitimacy of governance, quite 
apart from the outcomes of specific cases. Shany, supra note 13, at 231-32. 
 15. International tribunals are those that are created by international law, include 
independent judicial bodies, and have the authority to apply law to the cases before them. 
Shany, supra note 13, at 225-26. 
 16. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl.  
 17. Id. at art. 13(b) (explaining that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction when the 
Security Council refers a situation to the Court); id. at art. 16 (allowing the Security Coun-
cil to defer situations for a period of twelve months). Other provisions of the Rome Statute 
that address the relationship between the U.N. Security Council and the International 
Criminal Court are: art. 87(7) (allowing the Court to refer requests for cooperation to the 
Security Council) and art. 115(b) (allowing the United Nations to provide funds to the 
Court, especially in relation to situations referred by the Security Council). Id. at art. 87(7), 
115(b). Article 15 of the Rome Statute will be updated to further clarify the U.N. Security 
Council’s interaction with the Prosecutor’s investigation of crimes of aggression. Id. at art. 15 
ter (amended by Rome Statute Res. RC/Res.5, at 20 (June 11, 2010)) (noting that after 2017, 
the Court may exercise jurisdiction over crimes of aggression if referred by the Council). 
 18. See, e.g., Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights Situations and 
Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Representatives, Rep. of the G.A., U.N.  
Doc. A/C.3/70/L.47, at 3 (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/ 
%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_c_3_70_l_47.pdf (“Recalling the 
statements made by the Secretary-General, the United Nations High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council that crimes against 
humanity and war crimes are likely to have been committed in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
noting the repeated encouragement by the High Commissioner for the Security Council to 
refer the situation to the International Criminal Court, and regretting that a draft resolution 
was not adopted notwithstanding broad support from Member States . . . .”); Chris McGreal, 
UN Security Council Is Failing Syria, Ban Ki-moon Admits, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2015, 05:52 
EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/un-security-council-is-failing-syria-ban-
ki-moon [https://perma.cc/9HYF-4G9E] (“The UN secretary general told th[e] Guardian 
that Russia and China should ‘look beyond national interest’ and stop blocking security 
council action on the conflict in Syria . . . .”); Letter from Thomas Gürber, Chargé 
d’affaires, to Mohammad Masood Khan, President of the Security Council  
(Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/29293.pdf 
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victims of atrocities will otherwise languish if the Council does not 
refer, and if the ICC does not pursue Council referrals. Indeed, the 
concern is that the very purposes of the ICC, including to end im-
punity and to deter future atrocities, will be undermined if the ICC 
fails to act against wrongdoers when it has jurisdiction. Yet, despite 
repeated pressure from many Member States of the General As-
sembly, as of January 2017, the Council has refused to refer situa-
tions to the ICC since its referral of Libya in 2011.19 It is highly 
likely, however, that the Council will again use the relatively low-
cost tool (for the Council) of referring a situation to the Court in  
the future.   
 Particularly in light of recent developments in the Office of the 
Prosecutor,20 this Article challenges the conventional wisdom that 
the Prosecutor should devote resources to investigating and charg-
ing in the case of a future Council referral. It contemplates that the 
interests of justice might lead the Prosecutor to seriously consider 
declining investigating or prosecuting a Council referral. Further, it 
explores how the Prosecutor might instead use her “weapons of the 
weak”21—declination coupled with an explanation—to engage the 
Council earlier and more productively (for the ICC) in the future. 
Although prosecutors in common law systems often exercise discre-
tion without explanation, the ICC Prosecutor has wisely developed 
                                                                                                                  
[https://perma.cc/6XQ5-AETB]; Syria and the International Criminal Court  
Questions and Answers, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, 1 (Sept. 2013), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Q%26A_Syria_ICC_Sept2013_en_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DH8K-Q9RY] (“The Security Council, with what is called an ‘ICC refer-
ral,’ could give the court jurisdiction stretching back to the day the Rome Statute entered 
into force, on July 1, 2002. . . . The Security Council, however, has failed to act on other key 
occasions when there was strong evidence of widespread and serious international crimes 
and little prospect of local accountability. . . . Human Rights Watch believes that the court 
should be given jurisdiction, considering the evidence that serious crimes have been committed 
in Syria, the pervasive climate of impunity there, and the grave nature of many of the abus-
es.”); UN Security Council: Heed Call for Justice in Syria, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 14, 2013, 
11:54 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/14/un-security-council-heed-call-justice-syria 
[https://perma.cc/YHW9-XWCC]. 
 19. Indeed, as described further, infra, in Section III.C., in light of the obstacles, re-
cently there has been much discussion about creating ad hoc tribunals. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 
269, 114th Cong. (2015) (“Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding 
the need for investigation and prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
whether committed by officials of the Government of Syria or other parties to the civil war 
in Syria, and calling on the President to direct the United States representative to the 
United Nations to use the voice and vote of the United States to immediately promote the 
establishment of a Syrian war crimes tribunal, and for other purposes.”). 
 20. For the recently adopted strategy, see Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecu-
tor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization (Sept. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Policy 
Paper on Case Selection], https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_ 
Case-Selection_Eng.pdf. 
 21. JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT 
RESISTANCE (1985). I am indebted to Professor Keith Bybee for this reference.  
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a tradition of transparency—explaining the Office’s decisions in an 
attempt to offset claims of such bias.22 
 The Prosecutor’s use of her discretion in the interests of justice23 
to decline future Security Council referrals could affect States Par-
ties’ perceptions of the ICC’s independence,24 its normative validi-
ty,25 and also its effectiveness. Of course, the possibility of declina-
tion is by no means a panacea for all of the ICC’s challenges—the 
impacts of declining a Council referral would be both negative and 
positive. Concerns that this proposal would raise and limitations to 
the proposal are addressed below. In light of the challenges that the 
ICC faces, this Article explains, however, why the Prosecutor 
                                                                                                                  
 22. Predictably, and understandably, not all of the constituency of the Rome Statute is 
persuaded by the Prosecutor’s policy papers and explanations. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, 
Feeding Time at the Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. JUST. TODAY (Nov. 23, 2016), 
https://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/icc-prosecutors-perpetuation-
of-the-fiction-of-objectivity/ [https://perma.cc/97QM-WXUQ]. Nevertheless, some scholars 
and constituents contend that these documents offer a valuable basis for engagement and 
signal a desire to be held accountable. See Ekaterina Trendafilova, A Good Working Docu-
ment of the Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. JUST. TODAY (Nov. 23, 2016), 
https://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/the-case-selection-and-
prioritisation-paper--a-good-working-document-of-the-office-of-the-prosecutor/ 
[https://perma.cc/J9RZ-KUSR]; Alex G. Whiting, Finding Strength Within Constraints, INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. TODAY (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.international-criminal-justice-
today.org/arguendo/icc-prosecutors-constraints-and-strengths/ [https://perma.cc/QW42-7Z3E].  
 23. A case may be inadmissible by reason of complementarity, insufficient gravity, or 
the more general concern of the interests of justice. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 17, 
53. For articles discussing the interests of justice standard, see also Robert H. Mnookin, 
Rethinking the Tension Between Peace and Justice: The International Criminal Prosecutor 
as Diplomat, in THE FIRST GLOBAL PROSECUTOR: PROMISE AND CONSTRAINTS 69 (Martha 
Minow et al. eds., 2015); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecuto-
rial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583 
(2007); Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor’s Discretion Not to Proceed in the “Interests of 
Justice,” 50 CRIM. L.Q. 305 (2005). 
 24. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tri-
bunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 955 (2005) (arguing 
that constrained judicial independence in international tribunals enhances effectiveness). 
 25. There are many forms of legitimacy. Here I refer to sociological legitimacy, or the 
beliefs of those actors (i.e. States Parties, United Nations members, NGOs, individuals) 
involved in the process of international criminal law that the legal institution ought to be 
obeyed. Sociological legitimacy, as contrasted with political philosophical understandings of 
legitimacy, is not the same as moral legitimacy, nor is it the same as Habermasian legiti-
macy. According to David Beetham’s noted definition, sociological legitimacy has the fol-
lowing components: 1) legality or rule conformity, 2) normative validity, and 3) appropriate 
actions. DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 271 (Peter Jones & Albert Weale 
eds., 1st ed. 1991). “Rules . . . are well grounded in normative beliefs accepted by the popu-
lation(s) . . . .” Id. at xiii. “[T]he starting point for [analysis of] social scientific  
[legitimacy] . . . is to understand these principles of legitimacy and the practices which 
support it in their own terms, not those we ourselves may endorse.” Id. at xi; see also IAN 
HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL 7 (2007) (“ ‘Legitimacy,’ as I use the term, refers to an actor’s normative belief 
that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.”). 
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should consider the option to decline entirely to investigate or pros-
ecute Council referrals and to issue an explanation for doing so.26 
 This inquiry fills a gap in the literature about prosecutorial dis-
cretion at the international level by focusing specifically on the rela-
tionship between the Prosecutor and the Council; a relationship 
that has broader implications for both institutions, as well as for 
the goals of international criminal justice generally.27 Professor 
Ohlin has argued that the Prosecutor must investigate referrals 
from the UN Security Council, as she is effectively mandated to in-
vestigate as a part of a “security” court in the case of referrals.28 
Other scholars understand it to be within the Prosecutor’s legal 
power to decline Council referrals, but it is less clear why, when, 
and how she might do so.29 
 Regarding the relationship between the Prosecutor and the 
Council, I have argued elsewhere that the first ICC Prosecutor 
treated the Council as an institutional ally while seeking to pre-
serve his independent judgment.30 He sought to work with the 
Council to achieve his mandate, but endeavored to (at least formal-
ly) maintain his independence and discretion.31 For the current 
                                                                                                                  
 26. The Prosecutor uses preliminary examinations as a device to monitor progress in 
different situations, and would still preliminarily examine a Council-referred situation. 
There are, of course, a number of trade-offs that she will need to consider in deciding when 
to decline a Council referral. In a separate draft, I consider those trade-offs.  
 27. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability 
of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510 
(2003); Greenawalt, supra note 23; Mnookin, supra note 23; Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, 
Prosecutorial Discretion Before National Courts and International Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 124 (2005); Héctor Olásolo, The Prosecutor of the ICC Before the Initiation of 
Investigations: A Quasi-Judicial or a Political Body?, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 87 (2003); 
Webb, supra note 23. 
 28. According to some legal scholars such as Professor Ohlin, the Prosecutor had the 
obligation to investigate and prosecute Council-referred situations. Jens David Ohlin, 
Peace, Security, and Prosecutorial Discretion, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 185, 186 (Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 2009); see 
also George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, The ICC—Two Courts in One?, 4 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 428 (2006). 
 29. See Danner, supra note 27, at 519.  
 30. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 24. 
 31. See C. Cora True-Frost, The International Civil Servant: How the First Prosecutor 
Engaged the U.N. Security Council, in THE FIRST GLOBAL PROSECUTOR 251, 251 (Martha 
Minow et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter True-Frost, International Civil Servant]  (arguing that 
the first Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, “chose to 
craft himself as an international civil servant, bound to independently apply the law and 
disregard politics” and “engaged in both regular contact and a markedly less hostile rela-
tionship” with the U.N. Security Council). Since his term as Prosecutor has ended, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo has been more candid about his views of the Council. Luis Moreno-
Ocampo Talks to Richelle Carey, ALJAZEERA AM. (Oct. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/talk-to-al-jazeera/articles/2015/10/23/luis-moreno- 
ocampo-talks-to-richelle-carey.html. 
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Prosecutor to decline a referral and explain that she is doing so be-
cause she knows that, for example, the Council will not support its 
referral of a non-consenting State, or that the ongoing conflict in 
this non-consenting State will prove too challenging for ICC inter-
vention absent Council support would admittedly be a bold action. 
Such an action might in turn, however, limit political gamesman-
ship by the Council, even as it also might open the Prosecutor to 
claims of bias. Correspondingly, Council members might then be 
forced either to internalize the cost of Council referrals or to fully 
cooperate with the ICC on existing Council referrals.32   
 The ICC’s relationship with the Council has affected a number of 
areas related to the Court’s general effectiveness, including support 
for the international criminal law (ICL) norms it promotes, its ca-
pacity to resolve international disputes and problems, broader sup-
port for the regime of ICL, perceptions of legitimacy of international 
authority, and its more idiosyncratic goals. While no prosecutorial 
decision is immune from critique, the Prosecutor’s power to delay or 
decline a Security Council referral in the interests of justice can be 
supported by the text of the Rome Statute, case law, and the prac-
tice of both the Court and the Council.33  
 Due to the Court’s limited jurisdiction and relationship with the 
Council, the Prosecutor must constantly balance selective justice 
concerns, on the one hand, and effectiveness concerns on the other. 
Some recent developments in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
may help address some effectiveness and fairness issues stemming 
from, in particular, its relationship with the Council. For example, 
the Prosecutor recently opened an investigation into the situation in 
Georgia.34 This proprio motu investigation not only marks the ICC’s 
first non-African investigation, but it also implicates permanent 
Council member, Russia. It may thus help to counter the selective 
justice concern that permanent Council members, which are non-
State Parties, will never be accountable for violations of ICL.35 In 
                                                                                                                  
 32. See infra Section III.C. While the Prosecutor has previously argued that there is a 
presumption for prosecution in the interests of justice, for reasons I discuss below, that 
presumption might be discounted in the case of Council-referrals. This Article does not 
develop a typology of when the Prosecutor can decline a Council referral; it rather offers a 
starting point for developing such a typology. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. For more information on the Georgia investigation, see Situation in Georgia, INT’L 
CRIM. COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia [https://perma.cc/QB4J-NBGN]. 
 35. No: ICC-01/15, Corrected Version of “Request for Authorisation of an Investigation 
Pursuant to Article 15”, 16 October 2015, ICC-01/15-4-Corr (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2160852.pdf (“The Prosecutor hereby requests au-
thorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber I, pursuant to article 15(3) of the Rome Statute, to 
proceed with an investigation into the Situation in Georgia covering the period from 1 July 
2008 to 10 October 2008, for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed 
 
270  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:261 
   
addition, in order to increase its effectiveness, the Office of the 
Prosecutor released a Case Selection Policy in September 2016.36 
Strategic goals for 2016-2018 include ensuring “a basic size which 
can respond to the demands placed upon the Office so that it may 
perform its functions with the required quality, effectiveness and 
efficiency.”37 The Office is, inter alia, seeking to “align the demands 
placed upon the Office with the realities of what may be achieved.”38 
 Despite the tension between these goals, the Prosecutor can ex-
ercise her discretion to enhance the long-term prospects for the 
Court. Unlike the Council, the Prosecutor can be held accountable 
for her decision to decline to investigate or to prosecute—the Pre-
Trial Chamber (PTC) may review such a decision.39 Indeed, in 2015, 
a majority of the PTC denied the Prosecutor’s decision not to open 
an investigation in the Mavi Marmara situation, and requested the 
Prosecutor to reassess the situation’s gravity.40 The Appeals Cham-
ber of the ICC, however, implicitly endorsed broad prosecutorial 
discretion when it ruled inadmissible the Prosecutor’s appeal of the 
PTC’s decision. The Appeals Chamber decision, as well as the fact of 
the PTC review, support the idea that the Prosecutor of the ICC 
might use declination to avoid the negative effects of the Council’s 
lack of support, while at the same time optimizing as much of the 
potential for productive collaboration with the Council as possible. 
                                                                                                                  
in and around South Ossetia.”). The opening of an investigation in the situation in Georgia 
implicates the interests of Russia, a P5 member, and will raise unprecedented issues for 
the Court, in particular relating to its relationship with the Security Council. 
 36. Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization, supra note 20. 
 37. Int’l Crim. Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, at 6 ¶ 4 (July 
6, 2015) [hereinafter, Strategic Plan 2016], https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715-
OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDH2-UXA7]. 
 38. Id. at 7 ¶ 6. 
 39. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 53(3)(a)-(b) (“At the request of the State 
making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council under article 13, paragraph (b), 
the Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision of the Prosecutor under paragraph 1 or 2 not 
to proceed and may request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision. In addition, the Pre-
Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed 
if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor 
shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.”). 
 40. Case No. ICC-01/13 OA, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal 
against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecu-
tor’s decision not to initiate an investigation,” ¶ 50–65 (Nov. 6, 2015),  
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2152672.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ8J-P5VT] (“[T]he 
ultimate decision as to whether to [proceed] is for her.”); Case No. ICC-01/13, Notice of 
Appeal of “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecu-
tor’s decision not to initiate an investigation” (ICC-01/13-34), (July 27, 2015), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2024328.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2TX-FW4A]; Case No. 
ICC-01/13, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecu-
tor’s decision not to initiate an investigation (July 16, 2015), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2015869.pdf. 
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The effectiveness and unique selective justice concerns that accom-
pany Council referrals arguably all militate in favor of considera-
tion of declination.  
 Part II of this Article provides an overview of the creation of both 
the UN Security Council and the ICC, as well as the existing legal 
frameworks for interaction. Part III elaborates on the possibility 
that the Prosecutor might use her discretion to manage the ICC’s 
relationship with the Council. Although the Prosecutor has few 
tools at her disposal with which to affect the course of the Council’s 
relationship with the ICC, she might use her “weapon of the weak,” 
or soft power, to decline a future referral, coupled with an explana-
tion of why the declination is in the interest of justice. This  
Part also examines the counterarguments and limitations to  
this possibility.   
 Part IV sets out a framework for conceptualizing effectiveness 
and makes the case that Council referrals create unique effective-
ness problems for the ICC because Council referrals affect many 
States’ perceptions of the ICC’s independence. This Part also makes 
the case that the ICC can be a more procedurally fair and effective 
source and interpreter of ICL than the Council because of the ICC’s 
normative specialization, its broad membership of and wide partici-
pation, and its institutional accountability and review mecha-
nisms.41 This distinctive accountability is evident in the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s capacity to legally review the Prosecutor’s decisions.42 
Offering the opportunity for the institution to endorse or override 
the Prosecutor’s judgment distinguishes the ICC from the Council. 
The Council, by contrast, is held accountable only through politics. 
Perceptions of fairness in the international community are far from 
uniform, so what enhances the fairness of the ICC for some States 
will not do so for all, but the pressing nature of the current critique 
of the ICC’s “selective justice” requires a change in its future prac-
tice—including potentially declining a Council referral of a non-
State Party to the Rome Statute.43  
                                                                                                                  
 41. See generally Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Accountability of International Prosecu-
tors, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn 
ed., 2015) (arguing that the ICC should use more than judicial intervention to address 
prosecutorial misconduct). 
 42. The Council may request review of the Prosecutor’s decision under art. 53(3)(a), 
and the PTC can initiate its own review of the Prosecutor’s decision. Rome Statute, supra 
note 6, at art. 53(3)(b). 
 43. While it is theoretically possible that the Council could refer a State Party of the 
ICC, it is more likely that the Prosecutor would initiate a prosecution. Also, while citizens 
of the P3 might be haled before the ICC if they commit massive atrocities in States Parties’ 
territories, not until the Court opened an investigation in Georgia was this a practical pos-
sibility. This Article focuses on the relationship with the Council as one route to enhance 
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 Part V unpacks a select number of the negative and positive ef-
fects of the Prosecutor declining to pursue a Council referral and 
some preliminary implications of this possibility. Declination would 
have implications for theoretical debates in international relations 
and international law scholarship. For example, authority in the 
international sphere can increasingly be seen as being subject to 
contestation among and between other international actors.44 In an 
unprecedented fashion, declination of Council referrals invites 
scholars to consider how the most established international organi-
zations and organs of the UN, such as the Council, today must 
share authority and power with the more specialized international 
organizations of the twenty-first century, such as the ICC.  
 As the adolescent ICC continues to grow, the Rome framework 
may eventually be a corrective to the traditional understanding that 
the UN Charter is the sole constitutional document of an interna-
tional system. It may eventually no longer be that the UN Security 
Council, with its power to bind Member States, sits unquestionably 
at the apex of an international system.45 Rather, international or-
ganizations may increasingly contest the authority of organs of in-
ternational organizations as growing fragmentation creates the pos-
sibility for multiple seats of authority. 
II.   THE ICC AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
FOR INTERACTION 
 This Section provides background on the relationship between 
the UN Security Council, the ICC, and their respective founding 
documents. States’ political interests shaped the drafting of the UN 
Charter and the Rome Statute, and the resulting legal frameworks 
of each accordingly reflect the political power asymmetries of the 
time. As the founding document of a twenty-first-century tribunal, 
the Rome Statute enjoyed broad State and NGO participation and 
support. By contrast, the UN Charter, establishing an international 
                                                                                                                  
the Court’s effectiveness. Relatedly, this Article maintains that ICC Prosecutors should 
define as a priority or operative goal to successfully work with cooperating States Parties to 
secure jurisdiction and evidence over the accused in mandate holding States. Note, howev-
er, that some scholars have argued that the Court’s authority is not affected by the source 
of its different referrals. Leslie Vinjamuri, The International Criminal Court and the Para-
dox of Authority, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 275, 278 (2016). 
 44. PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW 
BEYOND BORDERS (2012) (offering a conceptualization of legal pluralism which “preserve[s] 
spaces for productive interaction among multiple overlapping legal systems by developing 
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to manage, without eliminat-
ing” difference amongst jurisprudences). 
 45. Member States are bound and obligated to carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council acting under Chapter V, Article 25 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art. 25. 
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system for the twentieth century, reflects the politics of that time. 
These asymmetries are especially significant when the ICC receives 
referrals from what is arguably the UN’s most powerful organ, the 
Security Council. This interaction between the two bodies affects 
the ICC’s current capacity to be perceived as an independent source 
of international criminal law by States Parties. 
 Examining the processes leading to the establishment of both the 
United Nations Security Council and the ICC helps us understand 
one of the ICC’s challenges in supporting international criminal law 
norms, namely, interacting with the Security Council and its three 
non-States Parties permanent members. It also offers insight into 
ways the Prosecutor might manage the relationship between the 
ICC and the Council in the future, a subject that is developed in 
Part III of this Article. 
A.   The Shaping of the UN Charter and the Rome Statute 
 International law is created through and shaped by a combina-
tion of States’ preferences, legal precedent, and also sometimes by 
the advocacy of norm entrepreneurs. So, too, are international or-
ganizations. From among the fifty States that initially ratified the 
UN Charter, the UN Security Council established the dominance of 
the five, then so-called Great Powers, in matters of peace and secu-
rity.46 The process codified select pre-existing provisions of interna-
tional law and created new laws.47 Even as colonial powers lost 
their grip on territories and the membership of the UN expanded, 
the authority of the UN Security Council endured.  
 The text of the UN Charter still gives the Council unparalleled 
power to bind Member States.48 Over time, the Council has used its 
Chapter VII powers to take action relating to threats to interna-
tional peace and security, inter alia, to authorize peacemaking, 
peacebuilding, and peacekeeping missions; establish ad hoc crimi-
nal tribunals; and to implement sanctions. The Council’s sanctions 
have increasingly focused on individuals. In the early 1990s, when 
the fifty-year old Council established ad hoc tribunals for Yugosla-
via and Rwanda, the Council also implicitly endorsed the view that 
international criminal law is applicable to violations of internation-
al peace and security committed by individuals.  
                                                                                                                  
 46. The original U.N. Charter from 1945 lists the fifty signatories that eventually 
ratified the charter. See U.N. Charter (1945).  
 47. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, arts. 25, 75-85.  
 48. U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”). 
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 When the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998, it built on the 
foundation established by the UN Security Council’s ad hoc tribu-
nals.49 While power disparities still influenced the content of the 
Rome Statute,50 an arguably nontrivial difference between these 
negotiations and those of the UN Charter was that more than three 
times the number of States involved in the UN Charter negotiations 
of 1945—160 States—participated in these negotiations, as did nu-
merous representatives of the United Nations and a vast network of 
NGOs.51 When the Rome Statute was ratified by 120 members in 
2002, it ushered in an unprecedented model of international cooper-
ation in international criminal law—one with global reach, but out-
side the absolute control of the permanent Council members. 
 Unlike the primarily State-focused model of the UN and its 
Council organ,52 the ICC’s twenty-first-century model of interna-
                                                                                                                  
 49. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Ses-
sion, 6 May - 26 July 1996, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-First Session, 
Supplement No.10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/ 
documentation/english/reports/a_51_10.pdf&lang=EFSXP. The International Law Com-
mission later generated a report, as did the General Assembly’s Preparatory Committee on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. See Rep. of the Preparatory Com-
mittee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2 
(Apr. 14, 1998). 
 50. For a critical and insightful analysis of the ways power disparities influence both 
the jurisdiction and the optics of the Court, see Kamari Maxine Clarke, Opinion, Treat 
Greed in Africa as a War Crime, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/01/30/opinion/treat-greed-in-africa-as-a-war-crime.html. See generally KAMARI 
MAXINE CLARKE, FICTIONS OF JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2009) (“documenting how hu-
man rights values are embedded in a new rule of law regime to produce a new language of 
international justice”). 
 51. The 1998 Rome Conference was attended by more than 160 governments and 200 
NGO’s. History of the ICC, Rome Conference, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. COURT, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=rome [https://perma.cc/YM6D-PVAX]. At the end of negotia-
tions, “120 nations voted in favor of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court,” with only 7 nations voting against the treaty, and 21 countries abstaining 
from vote. Id. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully analyze the scope and meaning 
of these various stakeholders’ participation, but numerous scholars have reported on the 
various impacts of participants’ contributions. See, e.g., William R. Pace & Mark Thieroff, 
Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT – THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 391-98 (Roy 
S. Lee ed., 1999); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 18 (4th ed. 2011); John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute 
for the International Criminal Court and International Lawmaking in the 21st Century, 11 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 361, 368 (1999). 
 52. The UN is primarily State-focused, but its Charter also references human rights 
norms. U.N. Charter pmbl. (“We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to reaf-
firm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in 
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small . . . .”); U.N. Charter art. 
1(3) (“The Purposes of the United Nations are: . . . [t]o achieve international cooperation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charter, 
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tional organization exerts its power directly on individuals. The 
preamble of the Rome Statute targets individuals, putting forward 
a goal “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes” and 
“to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of interna-
tional justice.”53 The drafters of the Rome Statute devised an ambi-
tious system of complementarity54 capped by an unprecedented 
permanent, autonomous and ostensibly apolitical ICC. In the pre-
amble of the ICC, States Parties “[r]ecogniz[e] that such grave 
crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world.”55 
Although the ICC is technically autonomous, its mandate to end 
impunity for international crimes overlaps significantly with the 
UN Security Council’s mandate to maintain “international peace 
and security.”56  
B.   Negotiations About the Relationship Between the ICC and the 
UN Security Council  
 The question of how, if at all, the ICC should interact with the 
UN Security Council was a pivotal one during the formation and 
the development of the ICC. The 1994 International Law Commis-
sion Draft Statute of the ICC initially recommended that the ICC 
would solely receive cases by either referral from the UN Security 
Council or self-referral by a State Party, except in cases of geno-
cide.57 Later, the “like-minded caucus” included more than 60 of 
the 160 participating States in the UN Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court in Rome in June and July of 1998 (Rome Conference). 
Its central concern was to ensure that the ICC had an independent 
prosecutor and that the Security Council could not veto prosecu-
tions, as well as that the ICC would have inherent jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                  
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . . . .”).  
 53. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl. (“Determined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes . . . .”). 
 54. Id. (“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this 
Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”); id. at art. 1 (same); see 
also id. at arts. 17, 18 (discussing States that are unable or unwilling to proceed in investi-
gations or prosecutions and the effects on the Court’s jurisdiction). 
 55. Id. at pmbl. 
 56. See Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 28, at 431-32. 
 57. In cases of genocide, the Court would have “ ‘inherent’ jurisdiction.” Int’l L. 
Comm’n, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court With Commentaries, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add/1, at 36-38, 41-42, 43-45 (1994).  
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over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.58 Some 
delegates in Rome noted that giving the Security Council power to 
refer cases to the ICC would obviate the need for ad hoc tribu-
nals.59 They emphasized, however, that the ICC’s judgments must 
be independent of political influence.  
 Indeed, when States came together in Rome in 1998 to create a 
permanent international criminal tribunal, they also implicitly—
and some did so explicitly60—rejected the Council’s politically-
influenced practice of establishing the ad hoc tribunals. They in-
stead aimed to create a comprehensive system of international 
criminal law and a permanent ICC, ostensibly outside of politics.61 
Broadly endorsing the project of international criminal law, the 
160 States attending the Rome negotiations created an interna-
tional court with broad, but not unlimited, jurisdiction. With many 
powerful States such as China, the U.S., and Russia, refusing to 
ratify, the prospects for universal jurisdiction were inherently lim-
ited. The system of international justice envisaged by the drafters 
of the Rome Statute relies on the willingness of States Parties to 
                                                                                                                  
 58. SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 19. Schabas notes that in 1997, the likeminded caucus 
also succeeded in procuring the support of the United Kingdom. See id.  
 59. 2 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings 
and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II), at 
76, ¶ 47 (June 15, 1998 - July 17, 1998) [hereinafter ICC Plenipotentiaries], 
http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf (Brazil: “Brazil 
believed it necessary to remove justification for the creation of new ad hoc tribunals by the 
Council, which would require a provision such as article 10, paragraph 1, of the draft Stat-
ute. The Court should not, however, act as a subsidiary organ of the [Security] Council and 
must aim for the highest level of judicial independence. Only in exceptional circumstances 
should [the Court] be prevented by the Council from investigating or prosecuting cases 
when the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, took a 
formal decision to that effect. Even in such cases, however, the Court should not be pre-
vented from exercising its jurisdiction for more than a limited period.”); see also id. at  
67, ¶ 38 (United Kingdom and Northern Ireland: “The Security Council should be able to 
refer to the Court situations in which crimes might have been committed, thus obviating 
the need for further ad hoc tribunals. The Court’s procedures should be adapted from the 
principal legal traditions to ensure fair and effective operation, safeguard the rights of the 
accused and provide adequate protection and assistance to victims in giving evidence.”); id. 
at 71, ¶ 104 (Observer for the International Law Commission: “Secondly, [The ICC] would 
be created by treaty, under the control of the States parties to that treaty but in close rela-
tionship with the United Nations. It would therefore obviate the need for further ad hoc 
tribunals.”); id. at 68, ¶ 55 (Sweden: “The Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter of the United Nations, should indeed be able to refer to the Court situations in which 
crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction appeared to have been committed but not punished. 
That would obviate the need to create new ad hoc tribunals.”).  
 60. Id. at 69, ¶ 70-72 (Lesotho); id. at 94, ¶ 41-42 (Lebanon); id. at 292, ¶ 70 (Ecuador); 
id. at 347, ¶ 44 (Cameroon); id. at 310, ¶ 82 (Yemen); id. at 196, ¶ 48 (Sri Lanka). 
 61. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully develop the ways in which States’ 
genuine aims, as opposed to their stated aims, have been both successful and unsuccessful. 
But for excellent discussion of these issues, see generally CLARKE, supra note 50.   
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comply with their obligations. It begins at the domestic level 
through the principle of complementarity. Only if domestic sys-
tems are unwilling or unable to apply criminal law to crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, genocide, or eventually, aggression, 
does the ICC become involved.62 
 During the Rome negotiations, the majority of States were con-
cerned with how to best ensure the independence and impartiality 
of this permanent tribunal.63 States’ desire to avoid political influ-
ence on determinations of legal jurisdiction caused them to depart 
from the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Statute rec-
ommendation that the Council be the only body to refer matters to 
the ICC.  
 The resulting debates revolved around the issues of (1) the ap-
propriate relationship between the Council and the ICC64 and (2) 
whether there should be an independent prosecutor.65 Not surpris-
ingly, three permanent Council members, the United States,66 
                                                                                                                  
 62. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl. (“[T]he International Criminal Court 
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal  
jurisdictions . . . . ”); id. at art. 1 (“[The Court] shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.”); id. at art. 17(1)(a-b) (discussing that the case is inadmissible if it “is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it” or “the State has de-
cided not to prosecute the person concerned”); id. at art. 18(2) (“[A] State may inform the 
Court that it is investigating . . . the Prosecutor shall defer to the State’s investigation of 
those persons.”); id. at art. 19(2)(b) (discussing that “[c]hallenges to . . . admissibility . . . may 
be made by: . . . [a] State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investi-
gating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted . . . . ”).  
 63. See ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59 (containing various States expressions of 
their concerns about the independence and impartiality of the ICC). 
 64. Id. at 65, ¶ 21 (Norway: “Once a situation had been referred, it must be entirely 
up to the Court to investigate and prosecute individuals on the basis of a truly independent 
mandate.”); id. at 69, ¶ 72 (Lesotho: “The relationship between the Security Council and 
the Court raised difficult questions. Although, in theory, no conflict should exist, the Coun-
cil’s maintenance of peace and security might either complement or frustrate the work of 
the Court in bringing war criminals to justice and advancing the international rule of law. 
He opposed any political interference by the Council or States in the affairs of the Court.”). 
 65. For a critique of the resulting choices, see Greenawalt, supra note 23.  
 66. Young Sok Kim, The Preconditions to the Exercise of the Jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Criminal Court: With Focus on Article 12 of the Rome Statute, 8 MICH. ST. J. 
INT’L. L. & PRAC. 47, 71-72 (1999) (“The first proposal was on Article 7 (Preconditions to the 
exercise of jurisdiction). This proposal required the consent of the territorial state and the 
state of the nationality of the accused/suspect. As such, it required the consent of the state 
of the nationality of the accused in every case if the Court wished to exercise its jurisdic-
tion. The second proposal of the United States was on Article 7 ter (acceptance by non-
States Parties) and Article 7 bis (acceptance of jurisdiction). Article 7 ter, paragraph 1 of 
this proposal showed the United States’ concern about the possible exposure of U.S. troops 
serving in foreign countries to the courts [sic] jurisdiction even if the United States is not a 
State Party to the Statute. The proposal on ‘possible protocol for opt-in’ permitted a State 
Party to ‘opt-out’ of crimes against humanity or war crimes or both. Moreover, it provided 
that the protocol should remain in force thereafter for a period of 10 years and might be 
prolonged. With regard to the United States’ amendments, Norway, on behalf of the Like-
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France, and the United Kingdom, emphasized that there was a 
necessary relationship between the Council and the ICC. Many 
States argued that although the Council could refer situations, the 
Prosecutor’s independence must be respected and maintained,67 
and some States objected to the possibility that the Council could 
defer or suspend matters. During the Rome negotiations, delegates 
from Africa—a region with no permanent representation on the 
Council—frequently noted that the political Council should not 
have a relationship with this independent, apolitical ICC.68 In-
deed, many States were opposed to the Council having any power 
to defer or suspend ICC matters for a year. Still, the Rome Statute 
eventually, or for realists, perhaps inevitably,69 granted this power 
to the Council.70 Regarding the independent prosecutor, the sixty-
                                                                                                                  
Minded Group, put forward a no-action motion. The voting result on the no action motion 
was 113-17, with 25 abstentions. Thus, the amendments of the United States were rejected 
by the overwhelming majority.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 67. See generally ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59 (see, e.g., statements by South 
Africa and Norway). 
 68. Id. at 65, ¶ 15 (Lesotho: “The relationship between the Security Council and the 
Court raised difficult questions. Although, in theory, no conflict should exist, the Council’s 
maintenance of peace and security might either complement or frustrate the work of the 
Court in bringing war criminals to justice and advancing the international rule of law.”); 
id. at 69, ¶ 76 (Egypt: “The International Criminal Court should be independent and 
should not be influenced by political considerations, and precise limits must be set in its 
relationship with the Security Council. The role of the Council in referring matters to the 
Court must be clearly defined, but it was for the Court to decide whether to commence 
prosecution proceedings or not.”); id. at 77, ¶ 67 (Kenya: “The relationship between the 
Security Council and the Court needed to be clarified to ensure that the independence and 
legitimacy of the Court were not undermined. A suitable mechanism for financing the 
Court had to be set up in order to preserve its independence.”). 
 69. Since the Council has the power to establish ad hoc tribunals as it has already 
done, it is perhaps not surprising that States opted to permit the Council to send situations 
to the Court. Yet, as noted above, diplomats and politicians argue that ad hoc tribunals will 
be required to fill gaps in the Rome framework. See Mary Fan, Custom, General Principles 
and the Great Architect Cassese, 10 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 1063, 1070 (2012); Pamela J. 
Stephens, Collective Criminality and Individual Responsibility: The Constraints of Inter-
pretation, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 501, 537 (2014). 
 70. See, e.g., ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59, at 122, ¶ 23 (Philippines: “Finally, 
the Security Council could seek deferral of prosecution for a one-year period, renewable for 
an apparently unlimited number of times.”); id. at 210, ¶93 (Italy: “The issue of the Securi-
ty Council’s power to block intervention by the Court was a delicate one, and it was im-
portant to provide guarantees that the Court’s action would not be indefinitely impeded or 
gravely prejudiced. Any request for deferral of an investigation should be made only follow-
ing a formal decision by the Council, and be confined to a specific period of time, with lim-
ited possibility of renewal.”); id. at 298, ¶ 63 (Sierra Leone: “[The] delegation would prefer 
option 2 for article 10, paragraph 2, if the deferral period was shorter, namely, 6 months 
rather than 12. . . . His delegation considered that the deferral request should be renewable 
only twice if it was for a duration of 6 months, or once if it remained at 12.”); id. at  
299, ¶ 73 (Azerbaijan: “As far as deferral was concerned, option 1 for article 10, paragraph 
2, was not appropriately formulated. A 12-month period seemed too long. Moreover, his 
delegation did not favour renewal of the request by the Security Council.”); id. at  
301, ¶ 115 (Russian Federation: “With regard to deferral, his delegation found it difficult to 
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three States that lobbied for an independent prosecutor initially 
did not include any Security Council members, but eventually  
the United Kingdom joined this group. France ultimately  
ratified the Rome Statute, thereby accepting the Prosecutor’s  
proprio motu powers.71 
C.   The Resulting Framework 
 The Rome Statute anticipates a cooperative relationship be-
tween the Council and the ICC while still asserting the ICC’s  
independence.72 As the tables indicate, the Statute provides  
a number of ways the ICC may interact with the Council.73 
                                                                                                                  
agree with any wording that might be interpreted as modifying the obligations of States 
under the Charter of the United Nations, in particular under Chapter VII. Moreover, the 
introduction of any time limit might be interpreted as affecting the Council’s powers under 
Chapter VII. His delegation was prepared to seek a generally acceptable option.”). 
 71. See SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 15-16, n.54. 
 72. Numerous Rome Statute provisions aim to protect the independence of the Prose-
cutor and the Judiciary. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 36, ¶ 2 (discussing proposals 
for increases of the number of judges; the Presidency may propose an increase, such pro-
posal is then considered and subsequently adopted if approved by a two-thirds vote of the 
members of the Assembly of States Parties); id. at art. 40, ¶ 1 (“The judges shall be inde-
pendent in the performance of their functions.”); id. at art. 42, ¶¶ 1, 4 (“The Office of the 
Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court.” Also noting the re-
sponsibilities and election process of the Prosecutor by secret ballot by an absolute majority 
of the Assembly of States Parties); id. at art. 48, ¶¶ 1-2 (The Court enjoys privileges and 
immunities necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes in each State Party, as well as the 
judges, Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutors, and Registrar.); id. at art. 36 (describing the 
“[q]ualifications, nomination and election of judges”); id. at art. 40 (describing the profes-
sional and independent nature of judges on the ICC); id. at art. 42 (describing the roles, re-
sponsibilities, and independent nature of the ICC Prosecutor); id. at art. 48 (describing the 
privileges and immunities of the judges, Prosecutor, and registrar within the “territory of 
each State Party”). 
 73. See infra Tables 1 and 2.  
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 First, the Council may refer situations—even those of non-States 
Parties to the Rome Statute, such as in the Sudan and Libya—to the 
Court.74 In fact, the only other way a situation can come before the 
ICC is through ex ante State consent—either when the State in ques-
tion is the territory where the alleged crime occurred, or it is the 
State of nationality of the accused.75 Second, the Council also may 
defer proceedings of the ICC for periods of up to a year.76 This provi-
sion anticipates the potential conflict between peace and justice, and 
permits the Council to focus on peace, at least temporarily, over ICC 
proceedings. Third, the Security Council can request the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate or to 
prosecute.77 Fourth, in the amended Rome Statute (“Statute”), effec-
tive after January 2017, in order for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression in a proprio motu or State-referred case, 
the Prosecutor must inform the Council.78 Should the Council refer a 
                                                                                                                  
 74. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 13(b) (“A situation in which one or more of 
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations . . . .”). The Court 
would not have had jurisdiction over cases in Sudan and Libya were it not for the UN Se-
curity Council’s referrals pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. This Article argues 
that it is more likely that the Council will refer a situation in a non-State party to the 
Court than one of a State Party. This is because States can self-refer and the Prosecutor 
can initiate investigations in her jurisdiction. In addition, the threshold for agreement of 
Security Council members is high—see failed attempts to refer the situation in Syria to the 
Court. Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court 
Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. 
Press Release SC/11407 (May 22, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/CZ7V-34XV]. 
 75. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 12, ¶ 2 (a) (requiring as a “[p]recondition[] to 
the exercise of [the Court’s] jurisdiction,” that “[t]he State [be] the territory of which the 
conduct in question occurred”); id. at art. 13 (A State may accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court with respect to the crime in question and shall cooperate without delay). It should be 
noted that referrals by States Parties mandate holders are not always immune from cri-
tique. See, e.g., Press Release, ICC, President of Uganda refers situation concerning the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, ICC-20040129-44 (Jan. 29, 2004). 
 76. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 16 (“No investigation or prosecution may be 
commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Secu-
rity Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council 
under the same conditions.”). 
 77. Id. at art. 53, ¶ 3 (a) (“At the request of the State making a referral under article 
14 or the Security Council under article 13, paragraph (b), the Pre-Trial Chamber may 
review a decision of the Prosecutor under paragraph 1 or 2 not to proceed and may request 
the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision.”).  
 78. Id. at art. 15 (The Prosecutor must inform the UN Security Council about the 
possible act of aggression, whether after State self-referral or a proprio motu determina-
tion. The UN Security Council then has six months to determine that an act of aggression 
has occurred. If the Security Council does not make a determination within the allotted 
time, the Prosecutor may only proceed if the Pre-Trial Chamber so authorizes. The Court 
has its own authority to determine whether an act of aggression has occurred.). For an 
Article providing the United States’ perspective on the current definition of aggression, 
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situation to the ICC, the ICC will not be prejudiced by the Council’s 
finding of aggression.79 Finally, Article 87(7) of the Statute provides, 
that when the Council has referred a situation to the ICC, the ICC 
may report to the Council any State that fails to cooperate with sub-
sequent proceedings.80 Neither the Charter nor the Rome Statute 
provides the ICC the legal authority to compel action from the Coun-
cil. In addition, since its founding, the ICC has entered into a Rela-
tionship Agreement with the UN to help facilitate cooperation, but 
this Agreement creates procedures for transmitting information be-
tween the ICC and the Security Council without at the same time 
creating unfailing substantive obligations on the Council.81  
 In short, the negotiation processes and treaties leading to the es-
tablishment of these organizations laid the foundations for a complex 
relationship between the ICC and Council, one that allows for possi-
ble conflict between peace and justice goals. The first two Prosecutors 
have each made choices as they have navigated these developments, 
trying to shape this relationship to be effective for the ICC in various 
ways.82 The time is now ripe for the Prosecutor to consider declining 
a future UN Security Council referral.  
D.   The Predictable and the Unexpected 
 The Council’s first referral to the ICC in 2005 was widely seen as 
a positive development for the ICC, particularly since three of the 
Council’s five permanent, veto-wielding members—the United 
                                                                                                                  
arguing that the Court should have a limited role in prosecuting the crime on the basis 
that “the highly controversial aggression amendments could enter into force on the same 
basis as the streamlined entry-into-force provisions for amendments ‘which are of an exclu-
sively institutional nature,’ ” see Harold Hongju Koh & Todd F. Buchwald, The Crime of 
Aggression: The United States Perspective, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 257, 289 (2015) (arguing 
that there are potentially negative effects of the aggression amendments that might easily 
be put into practice and are often highly politicized). 
 79. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 15, ¶ 4. 
 80. Id. at art. 87, ¶ 7 (“Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate 
by the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from 
exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to 
that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security 
Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.”). 
 81. Int’l Criminal Court, Negotiated Draft Relationship Agreement between the In-
ternational Criminal Court and the United Nations, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/3/Res.1, at 8 (Sept. 
7, 2004). Article 17 pertains to “Cooperation between the Security Council of the United 
Nations and the Court” and Article 17(1) indicates that in case of a Council referral, the 
Secretary General shall transmit information from the Court to the Security Council “in 
accordance with the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” Article 17(3) says 
that when the Court finds non-cooperation under Article 87(7), “The Security Council, 
through the Secretary General, shall inform the Court through the Registrar of action, if 
any, taken by it under the circumstances.” 
 82. See generally True-Frost, International Civil Servant, supra note 31. 
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States, Russia, and China—are not States Parties to the Statute, and 
had been hostile in various ways towards the ICC. The first two re-
ferrals to the ICC arguably served to enhance the ICC’s stature in 
the realm of power and international law and politics.83 The positive 
value of the Council’s recognition of the ICC through its referrals of 
situations in Sudan and Libya,84 however, has been counterbalanced 
by the Council’s many omissions in supporting the Court.85 In light of 
                                                                                                                  
 83. Many States Parties viewed the Council’s first referral as an endorsement of the 
Court’s mandate. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in 
Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351 
(Mar. 31, 2015) (Denmark: “[Denmark’s Representative] was encouraged that the Council 
had voted to adopt a resolution to bring an internationally recognized follow-up to the 
crimes in Darfur.” Argentina: “[This] resolution gave strong support to the Court and 
demonstrated significant progress within the United Nations to ensure the functioning of 
an international system for human rights, for which the Court was an essential tool.” 
France: “[France’s Representative] was gratified by the adoption of this historic resolution, 
by which the Council, for the first time, referred a situation to the ICC.” Greece: “The text 
strengthened the Council’s authority, as well as that of the International Criminal Court, 
which would have the possibility of showing its competence.”). Christian Wenaweser (ASP 
President), in a speech to ICC members in December of 2011, stated, “We as States Parties 
will have to think about the relationship between the Security Council and the  
Court. . . . We have had two referrals of situations by the Council, one of them by consen-
sus. This was essential in giving the Court the place it currently has. In the future, we thus 
no longer have to look at referrals from the point of view of acceptance of the Court—we 
have achieved that acceptance—but rather from the best interest of international criminal 
justice. This means in concrete terms a genuine commitment to ensure that justice is done, 
by providing the necessary diplomatic and financial support.” DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH 
JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS 172 (2014). 
 84. The Security Council referred to the Court situations in the non-State Parties 
Sudan in 2005, and in Libya in 2011. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4, 8 (Feb. 26, 2011) (recognizing 
that the UN shall bear no costs of the referral) (referring situation in Libya to the ICC); 
S.C. Res. 1593, ¶¶ 1, 7 (Mar. 31, 2005) (recognizing that the UN shall bear no costs of the 
referral) (referring situation in Sudan to the ICC). These two African States are not States 
Parties to the Rome Statute and have not directly consented to be subject to the  
Court’s jurisdiction. 
 85. Of the thirteen 87(7) non-cooperation findings the Court has transmitted to the 
Council as of April 2016, the Council has failed to respond to all of them. Prosecutor v. 
Nourain, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a Finding of 
Non-Compliance (Nov. 19, 2015); Prosecutor v. Hussein, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/12, Deci-
sion on the Prosecutor’s Request for a finding of non-compliance against the Republic of the 
Sudan (June 26, 2015); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for a Finding of Non-Compliance Against the Republic of the Sudan 
(Mar. 9, 2015); Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the non-
compliance by Libya with requests for cooperation by the Court and referring the matter to 
the United Nations Security Council (Dec. 10, 2014); Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-
01/09-02/11, Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under 
Article 87(7) of the Statute (Dec. 3, 2014); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-
01/09, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding 
Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court (Apr. 9, 2014); Prosecutor v. Al 
Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Non-Compliance of the Republic of Chad 
with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Mar. 26, 2013); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-
02/05-01/09, Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the 
Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect 
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the Council’s failure to support its referrals to the ICC fully, eleven 
years later, it is far from clear that, on balance, the referrals have 
enhanced the effectiveness86 of the ICC or perceptions of its fairness. 
The Council has clearly refused to support the ICC by, for example, 
refusing to fund its referrals and restricting funding from the Gen-
eral Assembly to the ICC.87 It has also failed to sanction ICC indict-
ees in situations it referred. It has neither established a committee to 
coordinate support for the ICC’s proceedings, nor taken action when 
                                                                                                                  
to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011); Prosecutor 
v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Corrigendum to the Decision Pursuant to Article 
87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with Coop-
eration Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-
01/09, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the 
States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s recent visit to Djibouti (May 
12, 2011); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision informing the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute 
about Omar Al-Bashir’s recent visit to the Republic of Chad (Aug. 27, 2010); Prosecutor v. 
Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision informing the United Nations Security 
Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-
Bashir’s presence in the territory of the Republic of Kenya (Aug. 27, 2010); Prosecutor v. 
Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council 
about the lack of cooperation by the Republic of Sudan (May 25, 2010); Int’l Criminal 
Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc. 
ICC-ASP/13/40 (Dec. 5, 2014); Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of 
the Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/12/34 (Nov. 7, 2013); Int’l Criminal 
Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc. 
ICC-ASP/11/29 (Nov. 1, 2012). 
In addition, the Council once demonstrated limited support of the ICC’s efforts in end-
ing impunity in Darfur by responding to one of the Prosecutor’s requests for support by 
issuing a presidential statement. In 2008, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo asked the Security 
Council to “send today a strong and unanimous message to the Government of the Sudan, 
requesting compliance with Resolution 1593 . . . .” Luis Moreno Ocampo, Statement to the 
United Nations Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 8 (Dec. 5, 2007), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1ADB9ADC-D65B-441A-863D-1139C5E42ED7/277794/ 
OTPST20071205UNSCLMOENG.pdf. In response, the Security Council issued a Presiden-
tial Statement of the Security Council stating, “In this respect, the Council urges the Gov-
ernment of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate fully with the 
Court, consistent with resolution 1593 (2005), in order to put an end to impunity for the 
crimes committed in Darfur.” Statement by the President of the Security Council, United 
Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST 2008/21 (June 16, 2008), http://www.un.org/ 
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2008/21; U.N. SCOR, 63d Sess., 5905th mtg. 
U.N. Doc. S/PV.5905, at 5 (June 5, 2008). 
 86. For a definition of effectiveness, see Shany, supra note 13, at 230. 
 87. Paragraph 7 of Resolution 1593 states “none of the expenses incurred in connec-
tion with the referral including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in con-
nection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations . . . such costs shall be 
borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute  
voluntarily . . . .” S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2005); Letter Dated 19 May, 2014 from the 
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/68/884-S/2014/361 (May 21, 2014), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ 
atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_361.pdf. 
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the ICC has reported noncompliance by States Parties to the Council.88 
Council members China, Malawi, and Nigeria, have even actively un-
dermined the ICC by hosting indictee Omar Al-Bashir for visits.89 
 As of November 2016, the ICC had conducted twenty-three public 
preliminary examinations—ten of which were ongoing90—initiated 
ten investigations,91 and issued thirty-nine arrest warrants or sum-
mons to appear in twenty-three cases.92 Of the ten situations that 
have come before the ICC, six were referred by States Parties, two 
were initiated by the Prosecutor, and two were referred by the Secu-
rity Council.93 The ICC has had custody over eleven defendants. Of 
                                                                                                                  
 88. It is interesting to note, but beyond the scope of this Article to investigate further, 
that the Council also has not sought compliance by States with judgments from the Inter-
national Court of Justice. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, THE RULE OF LAW: CAN THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL MAKE BETTER USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE?, (2016), 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/the-rule-of-law-can-the-
security-council-make-better-use-of-the-international-court-of-justice.php. 
 89. International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Rep. of the Bureau on 
non-cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/12/34 (Nov. 7, 2013) (reporting that Mr. Al-Bashir 
visited Nigeria in 2013); International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Rep. of 
the Bureau on non-cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/11/29 (Nov. 1, 2012) (reporting that 
Pre-Trial Chamber I rendered decision pursuant to 87(7) of the Rome State that Malawi 
had failed to cooperate with the Court’s request for the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir). 
 90. See, e.g., Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities 2016 (Nov. 14, 2016); Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecu-
tor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015 (Nov. 12, 2015); Int’l Criminal 
Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014 (Dec. 2, 
2014); Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examina-
tion Activities 2013 (Nov. 11, 2013); Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report 
on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012 (Nov. 11, 2012); Int’l Criminal Court, Office of 
the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2011 (Dec. 13, 2011). 
 91. Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx [https://perma.cc/2SN2-QWSJ]. 
 92. Leslie Vinjamuri, The Distant Promise of a Negotiated Justice, 146 DAEDALUS 
100, 101 (2017). 
 93. See supra text accompanying note 82. See generally Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-
01/12-01/15, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 
(Mar. 24, 2016) (referred by State Party Mali), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02424.PDF [https://perma.cc/JWF9-PVH3]; Prosecutor v. 
Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgement pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 8 (re-
ferred by State Party Central African Republic) (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF [https://perma.cc/Y34C-C8E8]; Situation in Geor-
gia, ICC-01/15, Investigation (Jan. 27, 2016) (referred by Prosecutor), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/georgia [https://perma.cc/2VG5-S2RN]; Situation with Central African Republic II, 
ICC-01/14, Investigation (Sept. 2014) (referred by State Party Central African Republic), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/carII [https://perma.cc/46D3-UJZH]; Registered Vessels of Comoros, 
Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13, Preliminary Examination (May 14, 2013) (referred by 
State Party Union of the Comoros), https://www.icc-cpi.int/comoros [https://perma.cc/V87X-
NHFS]; Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgement pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute, ¶ 9 (referred by State Party Democratic Republic of Congo) (Mar. 14, 2012), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF; Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-
01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) 
of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 1, 22 (referred by Prosecutor) (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.icc-
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the current cases, ten are in the pretrial stage, four are in the trial 
stage, and no appeals are pending before the Appeals Court.94 Seven 
cases are either closed or complete.95   
 Over the course of its operations, the ICC’s relationship with the 
UN Security Council has combined elements of the predictable and 
the unexpected. The relationship is arguably not what most States 
Parties expected it would be when the Rome Statute was drafted. For 
example, the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations 
and the ICC and Rome Statute Articles 115 and 87(7) demonstrate 
an expectation that the United Nations would help fund investiga-
tions in situations the Council referred, but the Council has forbid-
den such support.96  
                                                                                                                  
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_01006.PDF [https://perma.cc/7VX8-TWSU]; Situation in 
Libya, ICC-01/11, Investigation (Mar. 2011) (referred by UN Security Council), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya; Prosecutor v. Kony, ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the admis-
sibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute, ¶¶ 1, 37 (referred by State Party Ugan-
da) (Mar. 10, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01678.PDF; Prosecutor v. 
Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 1, 40 (referred by UN Security Council) (Mar. 4, 
2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF.  
 94. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/13, Opening of the trial (Sept. 29, 
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/car/Bemba-et-al/Documents/Bemba-et-alEng.pdf; Prosecutor 
v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Opening of the trial (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/drc/ntaganda/Documents/NtagandaEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15, 
Decision on the Confirmation of charges (June 12, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi/gbagbo-
goude/Documents/Gbagbo-and-BleGoudeEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Barasa, ICC-01/09-01/13, 
Warrant of Arrest (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/barasa; Prosecutor v. Hus-
sein, ICC-02/05-01/12, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 1, 2012); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-
02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest (July 12, 2010), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2T9-8CUN]; Prose-
cutor v. Harun, ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest (Apr. 27, 2007), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/darfur/harunkushayb/Documents/HarunKushaybEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK9U-EZHM].  
 95. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Case Terminated (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/rutosang/Documents/RutoSangEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ken-
yatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Charges Withdrawn (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta/Documents/KenyattaEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/UC5B-KGQ4]; Pros-
ecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Conviction and Sentence (May 23, 2014), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/katanga/Documents/KatangaEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LGZ-NKQZ]; 
Prosecutor v. Chui, ICC-01/04-02/12, Acquitted and Released (Dec. 21, 2012), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/ngudjolo/Documents/ChuiEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/X44E-4XL4]; 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Verdict and Sentence (July 10, 2012), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/lubanga/Documents/LubangaEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MCS-2RWL]; 
Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10, Released (Dec. 23, 2011), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/drc/mbarushimana/Documents/MbarushimanaEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Garda, ICC-
02/05-02/09, Confirmation of Charges Declined (Feb. 8, 2010), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/darfur/abugarda/Documents/AbuGardaEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L6U-FKFH].   
 96. Int’l Criminal Court, Negotiated Draft Relationship Agreement between the In-
ternational Criminal Court and the United Nations supra note 81, at art. 13, ¶ 2 ICC (“The 
United Nations and the Court further agree that the costs and expenses resulting from 
cooperation or the provision of services pursuant to the present Agreement shall be subject 
to separate arrangements between the United Nations and the Court. The Registrar shall 
inform the Assembly of the making of such arrangements.”). 
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 That the relationship between the Council and the ICC would be 
challenging was predictable. The choice of three permanent, veto-
wielding members of the Council, the United States, China and Rus-
sia, not to join the ICC did not foreshadow an uncomplicated rela-
tionship.97 These three permanent members’ failure to commit to the 
ICC certainly contributes to the Council’s inconsistent referral prac-
tice. Indeed, given the resistance to the ICC of three of the Council’s 
permanent members, its initial failure to refer any situations to the 
ICC might well have remained the status quo. 
 The United States’ legal inability to fund the ICC has also created 
obstacles in the relationship.98 Unprecedented developments in the 
relationship included the United States’ so-called Article 98 agree-
ments between it and Rome Statute Member States, intending to de-
feat the ability of the ICC to secure jurisdiction over American citi-
zens.99 Indeed, as a practical matter, in the early days of the Court, it 
was far from clear that the Council would ever be able to refer to the 
ICC in its work relating to international peace and security. Rather, 
the Council’s very first resolutions concerning the ICC were hostile, 
purporting to defer ICC authority over peacekeepers.100  
 But in 2005, the Council referred the situation in the Sudan to the 
ICC, with restrictions, and in 2011, it sent the situation in Libya to 
the ICC. Notwithstanding the emphasis of delegates at the Rome 
Conference on the need for solid funding and cooperation for the suc-
cess of the ICC, in both of its referrals, the Security Council purports 
to prohibit the General Assembly from offering financial support to 
the ICC, even for expenses relating to the Council’s referrals.101 Alt-
                                                                                                                  
 97. The United States and China expressed their opposition to the Court during the 
vote on the Rome Statute’s adoption. ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59, at ¶¶ 28, 33, 40 
(cited in SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 21).  
 98. Colonel M. Tia Johnson, The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act: Protect-
ing Whom?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 408 n.14 (2003) (“[T]he American Servicemember and 
Civilian Protection Act of 2002 . . . . prohibits United States government funds in support 
of the [International Criminal] Court.”). 
 99. Judith Kelley, Op-Ed., Big-Stick Diplomacy Ill-Serves Our Cause, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 4, 2004, at A23; William A. Schabas, The International Criminal 
Court and Non-Party States, 28 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 1, 20 (2010) (“In late Novem-
ber 2006, President Bush waived the penalties imposed upon countries that refused to 
reach bilateral surrender agreements . . . .”).  
 100. See S.C. Res. 1497, ¶ 7 (Aug. 1, 2003); S.C. Res. 1487, ¶ 1 (June, 12, 2003); S.C. 
Res. 1422 (July 12, 2002); see also Neha Jain, A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash 
Between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
239, 240 (2005) (discussing Security Council Resolutions that erode the power of the ICC 
by excluding its jurisdiction). 
 101. Compare S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 8 (Feb. 26, 2011) (recognizing that the UN shall bear 
no costs of the referral and referring situation in Libya to the ICC), and S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 7 
(Mar. 31, 2005) (recognizing that the UN shall bear no costs of the referral), with Rome Stat-
ute, supra note 6, at art. 115 (anticipating receipt of funding from the General Assembly for 
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hough the provisions of the Rome Statute anticipated the Council’s 
support for the ICC’s work in referred matters, politics have affected 
the Council’s capacity to provide support for its referrals. Indeed, the 
restrictions on funding are largely due to American domestic opposi-
tion to the ICC in the form of the American Servicemembers Protec-
tion Act (ASPA).102 The record and resulting documents of the Rome 
Conference show that a few delegates there contemplated the Council 
would prohibit UN-funding as a condition of its referrals.103  
 In addition, for those who hoped that the Council’s referrals would 
presage its support for the ICC, the Council’s failures to act are par-
ticularly disappointing. After the Council’s two referrals, the Coun-
cil’s continuing failure to refer to the ICC the situation in Syria,104 
where massive crimes are plainly occurring, has exacerbated percep-
tions of selective justice.105 The failure highlights the determinative 
role of politics in Council referrals. Council members failed to help 
enforce the ICC’s warrants, even in those cases resulting from situa-
tions the Council had referred to the ICC. 
 That permanent Council members, such as China and elected 
members Chad and Nigeria, would host President Omar Al-Bashir, 
whom the ICC indicted pursuant to a Council referral, was, for many 
                                                                                                                  
“expenses incurred due to referrals by the Security Council”). For support for the claim that 
the UN Security Council violates international law when it prevents the General Assembly 
from funding Council’s referrals, see, for example, Luigi Condorelli & Annalisa Ciampi, 
Comments on the Security Council Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC, 3 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 590, 594 (2005) (arguing that the SC’s forbidding funding in connection with the 
Darfur case is “at odds not only with [its] decision to refer, but also with the duty of good faith 
negotiations . . . .”); Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 28, at 430 (arguing that the SC’s referral of 
the Darfur case violated the “funding scheme” and “the spirit” of art. 115(b) of the Rome Stat-
ute); Isanga, supra note 5; W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, On Paying the Piper: 
Financial Responsibility for Security Council Referrals to the International Criminal Court, 
99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 615, 616 (2005) (quoting Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, who has written that 
“the general sentiment among the delegations was that if the Security Council refers a matter 
to the Court, the United Nations should pay the expenses”).   
In the travaux preparatoire, there was a lack of clarity about the funding of the Court. 
For example, at the meeting held in Cartagena de Indais, members of the Movement of 
Non-Aligned Countries stressed a need for a “suitable method of funding . . . to ensure re-
spect for the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.” ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59, at 
73, ¶ 16. However, the Overseer for the International Court of Jurists felt that the Court 
should be funded from the U.N. regular budget. Id. at 89-90, ¶ 76. Meanwhile, the United 
States suggested that the Court should be funded by the States Parties to the Rome Stat-
ute. Id. at 246, ¶ 47.  
 102. See American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-33 (2012).   
 103. See id.; ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59. 
 104. U.N. Security Council, Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_348.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW5F-VEP5].  
 105. Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court 
Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. 
Press Release SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).  
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States Parties, not expected.106 The Council has not entered sanctions 
against those who have been indicted by the ICC following its refer-
rals. Indeed, as of March 2016, no ICC defendant has been sanc-
tioned by the UN Security Council after being indicted by the ICC. 107  
 It also failed to issue country-specific resolutions or to sanction 
individuals in States that have violated their international law obli-
gations by failing to arrest ICC indictees in Council-referred situa-
tions.108 Yet, leaders in violating States are arguably breaking not 
just the terms of the Rome Statute but also Article 25 of the UN 
Charter.109 In June 2015, South Africa joined the list of African 
                                                                                                                  
 106. Lucas Buzzard, Comment, Holding an Arsonist’s Feet to the Fire? – The Legality 
and Enforceability of the ICC’s Arrest Warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, 24 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 897, 918 n.102 (2009) (citing Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando, 
Referral and Deferral by the Security Council, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 619, 627, 634 (Antonio Cassesse et al. 
eds., 2002) (noting that the Security Council’s actions are binding in nature under Chapter 
VII); Mohammed Amin, Defiant ICC Indictee Omar Hassan al-Bashir Flies to China, DAILY 
NATION (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Defiant-ICC-indictee-Omar-Hassan-
al-Bashir-flies-to-China/-/1066/2853142/-/13y0n1o/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/MLG6-GE7X] 
(noting that Omar Hassan al-Bashir also visited China in 2011); Omar Al-Bashir and the UN 
General Assembly: An Awkward Guest to Invite, DARFUR WOMEN ACTION GROUP (Aug. 21, 
2015), http://www.darfurwomenaction.org/omar-al-bashir-and-the-un-general-assembly-an-
awkward-guest-to-invite/ [https://perma.cc/QMP7-B5E8] (noting that Al-Bashir also 
threatened to attend the 2013 General Assembly only to later scrap his plans). Scholars 
who closely followed China’s role in and response to the international community’s reaction 
to events in the Sudan, however, might have expected China’s flouting of the Court’s au-
thority in the matter. See generally e.g., REBECCA HAMILTON, FIGHTING FOR DARFUR: 
PUBLIC ACTION AND THE STRUGGLE TO STOP GENOCIDE (2011).  
 107. See supra Table 1. “The Council’s Rome Statute Powers Vis-à-vis the ICC.” Of 
those Council-referred matters: The UN Security Council has sanctioned zero of seven 
indictees in the situation in the Sudan. The UN Security Council sanctioned three of three 
indictees in the situation in Libya before the ICC indicted them. Of State-referred matters: 
Six ICC defendants from Congo were listed by the Security Council before being indicted. 
There is some overlap between the list of indictees and those on the Council’s targeted 
sanctions lists, but that overlap has occurred only when the ICC acted after the Council. 
The Council has not followed the Court’s lead and sanctioned individuals indicted by the 
Court. It is beyond the scope of this Article to argue whether such a practice would be ad-
visable or not. For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that that while the Coun-
cil sanctioning indictees might raise new issues regarding the independence of the Court 
and the Council, it is nevertheless one tool the Council could use to support the Court.  
 108. International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Rep. of the Bureau on 
non-cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/15/31 (Nov. 8, 2016). 
 109. Under Article 25 of the Charter, Members of the United Nations agree to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
defend the notion that States that violate the implications of Security Council referrals are 
violating Article 25 of the UN Charter. For support of this argument, see, for example, 
Dapo Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on 
Al Bashir’s Immunities, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 333, 341 (2009) (“[S]ince the jurisdiction and 
functioning of the Court must take place in accordance with the [Rome] Statute, a decision 
to confer jurisdiction is a decision to confer it in accordance with the Statute. Thus, all 
states (including non-parties) are bound to accept that the Court can act in accordance with 
its Statute [in the case of Council referrals]. In this sense, at least, a non-party to the Stat-
ute is bound by the Statute in the case of a [Council] referral—in the sense that it is bound 
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States flouting the authority of the ICC by inviting Al-Bashir to visit 
during the African Union Summit. Nonetheless, the Council did not 
pass a resolution regarding South Africa’s illegal actions, although 
ten Council members at the time were States Parties of the Rome 
Statute.110 Not long after South Africa’s highest court ruled, in March 
2016, that the government violated its international law obligations 
by failing to arrest Al-Bashir during a visit,111 the South African gov-
ernment announced its withdrawal from the ICC.112  
 In addition, although the ICC has reported to the Council instanc-
es of State noncompliance in Council-referred cases, as anticipated by 
the Rome Statute in Article 87(7), to date, the Council has not re-
sponded to these reports.113 Over six years after the ICC’s issuance of 
two arrest warrants for the President of the Sudan on March 4, 2009, 
and July 12, 2010, the UN Security Council has still not taken action 
against non-compliant States.114 Council members fully understand 
                                                                                                                  
to accept the jurisdiction of the Court and legality of the Court’s operation in accordance 
with its Statute.”); Phakiso Mochochoko, Open Debate of the United Nations Security 
Council on “Peace and Justice, with a special focus on the role of the International Crimi-
nal Court,” address on behalf of the Prosecutor, at 3 (Oct. 17, 2012), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/ENGPMatUNSC_17102012.pdf [https://perma.cc/A39K-69W5] (“Once the 
Security Council decides to refer a situation to the Prosecutor, the judicial process has been 
triggered and the matter is fully in the hands of the Prosecutor and the Judges. The only 
way to stop the procedure is one of legal means, by invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statute. 
Efforts to interfere with the independent exercise of the Office’s mandate would only serve 
to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the judicial process, thus giving credence to 
allegations of politicization.”).   
 110. These States were: Chad, Chile, France, Jordan, Lithuania, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela. See Countries Elected Mem-
bers of the Security Council, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp [https://perma.cc/R2UQ-9T3L]. 
 111. The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. The Southern African 
Litigation Centre 2016 (1) SA 1 (SCA) at 74, ¶ 113 (S. Afr.); see Norimitsu Onishi, Omar al-
Bashir, Leaving South Africa, Eludes Arrest Again, N.Y TIMES (June 15, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/africa/omar-hassan-al-bashir-sudan-south-africa.html?_r=0. 
 112. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, South Africa: Withdrawal, 
C.N.786.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 19, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
CN/2016/CN.786.2016-Eng.pdf.  
 113. On March 9, 2015, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued a decision of non-
compliance finding that Syria failed to cooperate with the Court when it failed to arrest 
and surrender the Sudanese President, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, which it submit-
ted to the Council on March 20, 2015. The Court referred the matter to the Council to take 
“appropriate measures.” Bashir has visited six State Parties without being arrested: Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria, and was invited to 
attend the AU summit in Johannesburg, South Africa in June 2015. June 2015 Monthly 
Forecast, SECURITY COUNCIL REP. (June 1, 2015), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ 
monthly-forecast/2015-06/sudan_darfur_16.php; see International Criminal Court, Assem-
bly of States Parties, Rep. of the Bureau on non-cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/15/31 
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ICC-ASP-15-31-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9UWW-CG5N].  
 114. See Prosecutor v. Harun, ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision informing the United Nations 
Security Council about the lack of cooperation by the Republic of Sudan (May 25, 2015), 
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that the ICC does not have the independent ability to investigate sit-
uations successfully and to secure custody of its indictees without 
support from States or the Council.  
 In short, in many respects, the Council has not acted cooperatively 
with the ICC; for example, it failed to send strong signals of support to 
States Parties and UN Member States that they must comply with its 
decisions. The Council has significant discretion in navigating its rela-
tionships with the ICC, the Prosecutor has far less. What might hap-
pen, then, if the ICC Prosecutor exercised her relatively limited discre-
tion differently to manage this otherwise challenging relationship? 
III.   A WEAPON OF THE (RELATIVELY) WEAK: PROSECUTORIAL 
DECLINATION 
 Within the ICC, the Prosecutor has administrative power and dis-
cretion regarding numerous issues, including the place and timing of 
preliminary examinations, investigations, and whom to prosecute.115 
Within the limits provided by the legal framework, she can use her 
soft power and discretion to guide the relationship between the ICC 
and the Council. Even in the face of many obstacles the Council has 
created that impinge upon the ICC’s successes, there are possibilities 
for improving the effectiveness of the relationship. Two provisions of 
the Rome Statute allow the Prosecutor to use her discretion to de-
termine the admissibility of a case: the provision regarding gravity 
and the provision regarding the interests of justice. The Prosecutor 
otherwise has little leverage in dealing with non-State Parties to the 
Rome Statute. Her biggest sources of leverage are: (1) a supportive 
Security Council, (2) supportive Rome Statute States Parties, and (3) 
her soft power to influence States and IOs. 
 Although the literature on the overlap between international 
criminal law and politics is extensive,116 and much of it focuses on 
                                                                                                                  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc868180.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WS4-4NDB]; S.C. Res. 
2147 (Mar. 28, 2014); Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bu-
reau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/13/40 (Dec. 5, 2014); Int’l Criminal Court, 
Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-
ASP/12/34 (Nov. 7, 2013); Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the 
Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/11/29 (Nov. 1, 2012); International Crimi-
nal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Assembly Procedures Relating to non-cooperation, 
U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/10/Res.5, annex.  
 115. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 13, 15. Indeed, declining to investigate is 
not the only route the Prosecutor might use to control Court resources. She might prose-
cute only the lowest ranking individuals.  
 116. See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2007) (discussing how international criminals who perpetrate crimes of atrocity should be 
punished differently from traditional, western-based political concepts of punishment); 
Tom Ginsburg, The Clash of Commitments at the International Criminal Court, 9 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 499 (2009) (discussing the “clash of commitments” in the ICC and the Court’s in-
 
2016]  WEAPONS OF THE WEAK 293 
  
prosecutorial discretion, few scholars writing about prosecutorial dis-
cretion have focused on the question of how the Prosecutor could use 
her discretion to more effectively manage this critical relationship 
between the ICC and the Council.117 Often scholars have made rec-
ommendations hoping to shame or coax support out of the Council, 
but too often the Council has remained impervious to outside sugges-
tions of reform.118 A number of scholars have also considered how the 
Prosecutor might use her discretion to help the ICC to better achieve 
its mandate, including, for example, Rebecca Hamilton’s recent arti-
cle proposing that the Prosecutor might plan to exit some ongoing 
situations.119 A gap in the existing literature120 is therefore filled by 
                                                                                                                  
terest in going forward with prosecutions without regard to political considerations); Alex-
ander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the 
International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 134 (2009) (discussing issues with the 
ICC’s conflict with political interference and issues with legitimization); Jack  
Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 20 (2003) (discussing whether international 
criminal tribunals prevent or exacerbate mass atrocities and other human rights viola-
tions). For discussions about the ICC’s focus on Africa, see Margaret M. deGuzman, Is the 
ICC (International Criminal Court) Targeting Africa Inappropriately?, ICC F., 
http://iccforum.com/Africa [https://perma.cc/CD26-J2PC]. 
 117. For some recent contributions see Kevin Jon Heller, Can the Security Council 
Implicitly Amend the Rome Statute?, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 15, 2013, 7:02 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/15/can-the-security-council-implicitly-amend-the-rome-statute 
[https://perma.cc/UD4Y-4STB] (arguing that the ICC has no obligation to comply with a 
UN Security Council referral that does not meet the requirements of Article 13(b) of the 
Rome Statute); INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ICC 
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 (2013), 
https://www.ipinst.org/2013/03/the-relationship-between-the-icc-and-the-security-council-
challenges-and-opportunities [https://perma.cc/R5SY-38FQ]. 
 118. Arguments to reform aspects of Council practice abound. A wave of scholarship 
contemplated possible models for Council reform from the mid-90s to the beginning of the 
millennium. Since the permanent five have the authority to veto any proposed reform of 
the UN Charter, the likelihood, however, that the permanent membership of the Council 
will change is quite low. See, e.g., DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS (1999); David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Au-
thority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552 (1993); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The 
Relationship Between the Security Council and the Projected International Criminal 
Court, 3 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 97 (1998). 
 119. Rebecca J. Hamilton, The ICC’s Exit Problem, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (2014). 
 120. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 651 (“The Court centers on a prosecutorial 
mechanism that is incapable of meeting the very standard of legitimacy that its advocates 
have invoked to justify its existence. For that reason, the existence of prosecutorial author-
ity poses a far greater challenge to the mission of the ICC than does, for example, the nar-
rower debate over whether the Rome Statute contains sufficient protections against bias or 
prosecutorial abuse.”); Elizabeth C. Minogue, Increasing the Effectiveness of the Security 
Council’s Chapter VII Authority in the Current Situations Before the International Crimi-
nal Court, 61 VAND. L. REV. 647, 677 (2008) (“Instead, the ICC must consider changes it 
could make to its structure and jurisdiction in order to gain the United States’, and thus 
the Security Council’s, full backing and support and whether these changes would unfairly 
bias the ICC in favor of the United States.”); Victor Peskin, Assessing the Contemporary 
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targeting the Council-ICC relationship to consider how using her dis-
cretion, the Prosecutor might both increase the ICC’s effectiveness121 
and the meaningfulness of its prosecutions by addressing (some) 
States Parties’ concerns that the ICC is nothing more than an agent 
of the Council in dealing with its referrals. 
A.   Prosecutorial Discretion, the ICC and the Council 
 In the past, ICC Prosecutors have mostly tried to cooperate with 
the Council and have mostly refrained from pressing the Council in 
an aggressive fashion.122 Luis Moreno-Ocampo and Fatou Bensouda, 
the former and incumbent ICC Prosecutors, for example, have both 
complied with the Security Council’s resolution-based requests to be 
updated on the ICC’s progress twice a year, respectively, in the 
Council-referred situations in the Sudan and in Libya. So, in Decem-
ber 2014, when Prosecutor Bensouda announced she would freeze 
investigations in the Sudan cases,123 her announcement made head-
lines. Indeed, President Al-Bashir understandably greeted the Prose-
cutor’s announcement triumphantly, claiming that the ICC had 
“failed” in its mission.124  
                                                                                                                  
International Criminal Tribunals: Performance, Persuasion, and Politics, 108 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 122, 125 (2014) (“More specifically, these African leaders have sought to 
undermine the ICC’s moral authority by alleging that the Court is a politicized body driven 
by anti-African bias. This has real consequences for the ICC’s already uphill battle to per-
suade regional and international actors for concrete support with arrests, witness protec-
tion, and other forms of state cooperation crucial for institutional effectiveness.”); Colonel 
Stuart W. Risch, Hostile Outsider or Influential Insider? The United States and the Inter-
national Criminal Court, ARMY LAW. 61, 66 (2009) (“Accordingly, the United States, which 
still has an opportunity to play a significant role with the Court—and regain its reputation 
for an unyielding commitment to promoting human rights, justice, and the rule of law—
should ratify the Rome Statute or, at a minimum, adopt a strategy and policy of concilia-
tion and cooperation instead of obstruction and antagonism.”). 
 121. For purposes of this Article, I focus on goal-oriented effectiveness, centering on the 
goals of the mandate holders, which usually include primary norm compliance, dispute 
resolution, regime support, and regime legitimization. There are tradeoffs between each of 
these goals. See Shany, supra note 13, at 265; see also discussion infra Part IV. Within the 
Court, different mandate holders may also focus on different goals. For an excellent article 
analyzing some of the difficult tradeoffs involved in case selection, see, Margaret M. 
deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal 
Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2012).   
 122. See generally True-Frost, International Civil Servant, supra note 31.  
 123. See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., supra note 2. The first Prosecutor was elected by the 
Assembly of State Parties in 2003 and Prosecutor Bensouda was elected in 2011. Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, GETNICK & GETNICK COUNSELLORS AT L., http://getnicklaw.com/our-
team/luis-moreno-ocampo/ [https://perma.cc/7SWF-V93C]; Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L 
CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp?ln=en [https://perma.cc/N9B4-DQ5G]. 
 124. Sudan’s President: ICC ‘Failed’ in Prosecution Effort, VOA NEWS (Dec. 13, 2014, 
11:59 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/icc-suspends-sudan-war-crimes-inquiry/2557685.html 
[https://perma.cc/UM7L-L8W8]. The Court has had difficulty with many cases recently, for 
example, the Prosecutor’s announcement about Al-Bashir came in close succession to her 
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 The ICC currently is at risk of becoming irrelevant through its slow 
progress in cases, its inability to secure the support it requires in the 
States where it is investigating and prosecuting, and its failure to se-
cure referrals of critical situations from the Council.125 The Prosecutor’s 
declining a referral by the Council in the future, along with a statement 
of the reasons why, might well allow the ICC to preserve valuable re-
sources. The ICC could focus on situations referred by its mandate 
holders or initiated by the Prosecutor, and might build a more construc-
tive relationship with the Council regarding future referrals.126  
 As the Assembly of State Parties has recently acknowledged, the 
Prosecutor’s capacity to control the flow of cases and resources will be 
critical to the future effectiveness of the ICC.127 That so many States 
Parties are dissatisfied with the ICC’s docket and results matters, 
not least because the ICC’s capacity to effectuate results still depends 
on its ability to marshal support from its State Parties. Of course, all 
“international institutions, their officials and outcomes are accorded 
legitimacy to the extent that they conform to the legal requirements 
set out in their founding treaties . . . .,”128 but for a Court whose en-
forcement capacity rests entirely with its members, this legitimacy is 
even more critical.  
 Under the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor has the legal authority to 
decline a Council referral in the interests of justice.129 The Prosecu-
tor’s 2003 Policy Paper notes, “States and the Office have to evaluate 
how successful investigations and prosecutions can be in situations 
where the necessary cooperation is lacking. Cooperation becomes 
more than ever before a critical success factor if the Office is going to 
achieve positive results.”130 At this adolescent point in the ICC’s in-
                                                                                                                  
Office’s withdrawal of charges against the President of Kenya. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ken-
yatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Withdrawal of Charges Against Mr. Kenyatta (Mar. 
13, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1936247.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M9U-UPA8]. 
 125. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 119 (arguing that the ICC needs an exit strategy to 
be more efficient in its work and to ameliorate some of its problems). 
 126. Not all situations referred by mandate holders are equal, and this argument does 
not engage the related but distinct question of whether the Prosecutor might refuse to in-
vestigate some State self-referrals. For more on the implications and broader framework, 
see infra Part V. 
 127. Strategic Plan 2016, supra note 37, at 6 (“Despite improvements in Office re-
sources over the past two years, resources are still insufficiently aligned with the demands 
placed upon the Office for intervention . . . .”). 
 128. BEETHAM, supra note 25, at 271. 
 129. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 53, ¶¶ 1-2. 
 130. Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2012-2015 at 5, ¶ 3. 
Id. at 13, ¶19 (“The Office however faces an even bigger challenge . . . [as] the investigative 
tools it has available are more limited and depend on State cooperation. Specialized inves-
tigative techniques are in most cases not feasible or available (e.g. infiltration, interception 
of voice and electronic communication, controlled delivery, etc). Such obstacles can only be 
overcome if the Office if getting full cooperation from all partners involved.”); Strategic 
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stitutional history, the Prosecutor’s reasoned consideration of decli-
nation is merited in order “to guarantee lasting respect for and the 
enforcement of international justice.”131  
 In making the decision to decline to investigate or to prosecute a 
Council referral, the Prosecutor would of course be mindful that the 
decision may be reviewed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.132 Regardless of 
whether upholding or overturning the Prosecutor’s decision to de-
cline, such review could well add to the legitimacy of the Prosecutor’s 
decision.133 Still the full legal and practical scope of the Prosecutor’s 
discretion remains largely unchartered.  
B.   Mechanisms of Influence: The Power of the Weak 
 The Prosecutor’s authority and discretion are composed of both 
soft and hard power. This Section unpacks the theoretical underpin-
ning of the potential power of declination in order to better under-
stand the possibility that the Prosecutor might abstain from acting 
on a Council referral. By offering an explanation when she does so, 
she can use her power to persuade. This is her main weapon for pos-
sibly increasing the ICC’s effectiveness in cases of Council referrals. 
It also allows her to focus valuable resources on the Court’s  
mandate holders.134 
                                                                                                                  
Plan 2016, supra note 37, at 13, ¶ 26 (“As already mentioned in the Strategic Plan (June 
2012-2015), ‘States and the Office have to evaluate how successful investigations and pros-
ecutions can be conducted in situations where the necessary cooperation is lacking. Coop-
eration becomes more than ever before a critical success factor if the Office is going to 
achieve positive results.’ ”). 
 131. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl. 
 132. Id. at art. 53, ¶ 3. 
 133. Recently, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC implicitly endorsed broader prosecuto-
rial authority for the OTP. Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Case No. 
ICC-01/13, Notice of Appeal of “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to 
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation,” (July 27, 2015), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2024328.pdf [https://perma.cc/KXW4-9RK7]. When, in 
November 2015, the Appeals Chamber declined the Prosecutor’s appeal, it also indirectly 
affirmed the Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate the situation of the Mavi Marmara. 
Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Case No. ICC-01/13 OA, Decision on 
the Admissibility of the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the “Decision on the request of the 
Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation,” 
(Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2152672.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVZ7-
HC8X]; Situation on the Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Case No. 
ICC-01/13, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s 
decision not to initiate an investigation, (July 16, 2015), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2015869.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ7D-GVE9]. 
 134. ICC States Parties are all mandate holders in the enterprise of international crim-
inal law and bear responsibilities for enforcing the provisions of the Rome Statute in ways 
that non-State Parties Council members do not. Mandate holders may try to use the Court 
for their own goals, which may not align well with those of other mandate holders, victims, 
or the Court overall.  
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 This possible course of action is situated at the intersection of con-
structivist and rational choice theory—probing as it does the outer 
limits of norm diffusion.135 The proposal stems from the concern that 
the ICC’s capacity to promote and diffuse ICL norms in situations 
referred by the Council is limited by the Council’s lack of support and 
enforcement. From a constructivist perspective,136 State interests can 
be shaped and norms can be supported and diffused even in the  
face of tremendous power asymmetries. Over time, States may inter-
nalize ICL norms, even in the face of non-enforcement at the  
international level.  
 At this point in the Court’s work, ongoing lack of funding, support, 
and the non-compliance by Council members in these high-profile 
referred cases, however, exacerbates the negative optics for the Court 
more than it assists in norm diffusion. Thus, the ICC Prosecutor 
might prepare to say no to the Council in the interests of justice for a 
number of reasons—some animated by constructivist concerns, but 
also some stemming from rational choice approaches.  
 Rather than taking State self-interest as a given, constructivists 
are interested in the content of State interests and the social 
processes through which norms diffuse.137 Indeed, simple rational 
calculations of self-interest are not sufficient motivators of States’ 
behavior—rather a satisfactory account of causal motivators requires 
consideration of norms and beliefs.138 Constructivists do not deny 
that self-interest is causally significant, but argue instead that ideas 
meaningfully shape States’ perceptions of what is in their self-
interest.139 For these scholars, norms may have a causal power of 
their own. According to Martha Finnemore’s theory of norm diffusion 
                                                                                                                  
 135. Norm diffusion is defined as the process by which “collectively held ideas about 
behavior” are promoted. MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY 22-23 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996). 
 136. Social science-oriented, constructivist political scientists and many legal scholars 
emphasize the ideational and constitutive role of norms in shaping actors’ preferences. For 
these scholars, State interests are a product of social processes. See generally Martha Fin-
nemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L 
ORG. 887 (1998); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-
Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998) (discuss-
ing the historical development of constructivism); Alexander Wendt, Constructing Interna-
tional Politics, 20 INT’L SECURITY 71 (1995). 
 137. See James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skepti-
cal View, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 52 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 
2002); FINNEMORE, supra note 135, at 3-4.  
 138. FINNEMORE, supra note 135, at 2-3.  
 139. Id. at 15 (“Socially constructed rules, principles, norms of behavior, and shared 
beliefs may provide states, individuals, and other actors with understandings of what is 
important or valuable and what are effective and/or legitimate means of obtaining those 
valued goods.”). 
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at the international level, realists’ causal arrows can be reversed and 
international organizations and NGOs can be seen to shape the 
interests of States.140 Norm-based international legal theorists 
emphasize the content, or legitimacy, of the international norm and 
the process of legal interactions that lead to its horizontal or  
vertical integration.141  
 For rational choice-based (neo)realist and institutionalist 
theorists, however, in the anarchic world of international relations,142 
States act rationally to maximize self-interest and power.143 For these 
theorists, norms (such as ICL norms) promoted by international 
organizations and States, are mere cloaks for the instrumental goals 
of the most powerful States.144 
 That the Prosecutor might use her weapon of discretion to decline 
future Council referrals is a controversial suggestion145 emanating 
                                                                                                                  
 140. Id. at 13, 22. 
 141. Thomas Franck’s legitimacy theory and Abram and Antonia Chayes’s managerial 
legal process theory are norm-based approaches. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER 
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
AGREEMENTS 22-25 (1995) (emphasizing intergovernmental cooperation as an effective 
alternative to coercive enforcement mechanisms in their managerial legal process theory); 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 43-49 (1990) (arguing 
that compliance with international law will be secured when a legal norm is perceived to be 
fair and legitimate).  
 142. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1973); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS (1979). 
 143. See generally Fearon & Wendt, supra note 137, at 61 (arguing that international 
law emerges from States acting rationally to maximize their interests).  
 144. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
139 (2005); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, in REGIME 
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1995). Rational choice-
based contractual institutionalists also believe that States pursue “self-interest,” but differ 
from (neo)realists by accepting that international organizations’ coordination can affect 
State behavior. Contractual institutionalists argue that institutions change the cost-benefit 
analysis of State actors by encouraging short-term cooperation for long-term power inter-
ests. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 107 (1984). Rational choice-based liberal theorists peer into the black 
box of State “interest” to ascertain what occurs at the national level. While they agree that 
States adopt human rights norms and laws out of self-interest, they argue that State inter-
ests are defined by the preferences of individuals and national interest groups within the 
State. In response to interest group pressure and tactics, States promote the norms advo-
cated by these groups through legal processes. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the 
Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 177, 205 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seri-
ously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 516-20 (1997); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, Lecture Before Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting, in 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 240, 241 (2000). 
 145. She may be playing hardball in using her discretion in this way. Mark Tushnet, 
Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004) (describing legal and 
political moves “within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but that 
are nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings”).  
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from an acceptance that, in the context of diffusing international 
criminal law norms in particular, the ICC would do well to focus on 
the support of its mandate holders. 
 In making a declination, the Prosecutor should consider the possi-
ble motives of various Council members in making referrals to the 
ICC.146 Of course Council members’ motives need not exactly match 
the goals of the ICC, but any disconnect may indeed be relevant to 
the Prosecutor’s decision-making. Council referrals arguably allow 
the Council to engage crises without assuming direct responsibility 
for the outcomes that follow. Council referrals to the ICC lower the 
political costs for the Council organ, which might otherwise be ac-
cused of inaction—a vast political science literature describes how 
courts lower the political costs for other actors,147 even as they might 
also concurrently raise the costs for the ICC.148 When the referral ap-
pears to be merely a pressure release valve for the Council, the Pros-
ecutor might consider declining. 
 Regardless of the outcome of a particular ICC referral, in the 
short-term, the Council organ arguably benefits. United Nations 
Member States’ arguably perceive the Security Council’s commitment 
to its collective mandate to preserve international peace and security.  
C.   Limitations to and Concerns About Prosecutorial Declination of 
Council Referrals 
 This Section sets out some basic limitations regarding the idea of 
declining a Council referral to improve the effectiveness of the Court 
and addresses some concerns about the idea. As to limitations, first, 
this Article provides reasons the Prosecutor might understandably 
decide to decline Council referrals and identifies some of the relevant 
consequences and implications of such a decision, but it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to define precisely the situations in which the 
Prosecutor should say no to the UN Security Council. In addition, it 
is beyond the scope of this Article to provide the full legal argument 
justifying the Prosecutor’s declining to investigate or prosecute a Se-
curity Council referral in the interests of justice. A preliminary in-
terpretation of the law circumscribing the Prosecutor’s discretion un-
                                                                                                                  
 146. While in many cases, it may be difficult to definitively establish what these moti-
vations are, the Council’s open debates usually disclose the official reason for the State’s 
action in International Criminal Court. See, e.g., Report on Preliminary Examina-
tion Activities 2013, supra note 90; Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014, 
supra note 90; Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015, supra note 90. 
 147. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 24. 
 148. Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role 
in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EURO. L. 565, 588-92 (2006). 
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der Article 51 supports her power to do so.149 The Prosecutor broaden-
ing her interpretation of Article 53’s interests of justice standard 
would leave her open to criticisms of selective justice. Given the con-
strained jurisdiction of the Court, this criticism is to some degree in-
escapable. The Prosecutor would need to explain her rationale for 
declination clearly. Given the evidence surveyed here, the Council’s 
political processes have arguably not, thus far, been compatible with 
effective ICC adjudication.  
1.   The Long-Term Success of the Institution Should Be Valued by 
the Prosecutor 
 The Rome Statute’s preamble includes the goal that “serious 
crimes . . . must not go unpunished,”150 yet as the ICC is necessarily 
one of limited jurisdiction that is structurally incapable of reaching 
many crimes, and to the extent that it is constrained by the coopera-
tion of its Member States, its broadest preambular goals are, at pre-
sent, arguably aspirational. At this point in the ICC’s tenure, it is not 
clear that the object and purpose of the statute and the interests of 
victims are served by having the ICC ineffectively plunge into an in-
vestigation and prosecution. Rather, this Article assumes that it is in 
the long-term interests of the global community, including victims of 
atrocity, for an independent ICC to establish its authority within the 
scope of its jurisdiction, and not to struggle for survival and political 
support. Given the many challenges the ICC faces, prosecutorial dec-
lination and restraint, even in the face of possible massive atrocities, 
might well be helpful tools for the longevity of the Court. Although 
there will be short-term costs to declination, including allowing a sit-
uation to go unaddressed by the Court, viewed over the long-term, 
the goals of the ICC and its mandate holders may be helped by de-
                                                                                                                  
 149. Briefly, the argument is that the Prosecutor can legally decline to investigate or to 
prosecute Security Council referrals in the interests of justice. The preamble of the Rome 
Statute, inter alia, reaffirms the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, affirms that 
serious crimes must not go unpunished, determines to put an end to impunity, and resolves 
“to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice.” Rome Stat-
ute, supra note 6, at pmbl. The legal argument that the Prosecutor can decline to investi-
gate a Council referral in the interests of justice is more fully developed in a working paper 
titled, Saying No to the Security Council in the Interests of Justice. C. Cora True-Frost, 
Saying No to the Security Council in the Interests of Justice (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). The Rome Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the Regula-
tions of the Office of the Prosecutor lay out the legal rules for whether the Prosecutor 
should proceed with an investigation or must prosecute. The Prosecutor’s Policy Papers 
and letters represent non-binding interpretations of the Rome Statute and Regulations. In 
addition, ICC case law, which is non-precedential, but highly influential, is developing a 
more sophisticated understanding of the parameters of prosecution discretion. Rome Stat-
ute, supra note 6, at art. 20 (listing the areas of applicable law in ICC trials, not including 
reference to prior case precedent). 
 150. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl. 
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clining a Council referral in the short-term for the reasons laid out 
above. Declination need not be an irresponsible move for a Prosecutor 
responding to a Council that has arguably violated the intent of the 
drafters of the Rome Statute, including for example, by restricting 
the Court’s ability to secure funding.151   
2.   Assumptions About Collective Action 
 This Article’s focus is on improving a critical aspect of the ICC’s 
long-term effectiveness: its relationship with the Council. This Arti-
cle assumes that both the Prosecutor’s Office and the Council organ 
are ultimately invested in their respective institutions’ longevity. 
Some readers may dispute this methodological assumption, arguing 
that because the Prosecutor works in an organization with four dif-
ferent organs, including the Assembly of State Parties, and the 
Council is composed of many Member States, the various parties’ mo-
tivations matter. To speak meaningfully about effectiveness, there-
fore, the interests of the individual players within the organs must be 
disaggregated. There are multiple interests at stake within each in-
stitution and organ, but the reputation of both the UN and the ICC 
will rise or fall with each one’s ability to accomplish their respective 
goals.152 While future analysis of micro-level interactions within each 
of the organs and how they may in turn affect the over-all goals of 
these institutions might well be helpful to better understanding 
which referrals to decline, such analysis will likely not vitiate the 
basic assumption that over-all, members of these collective organs 
have an interest in their own organs’ continued longevity.  
3.   Council Referrals May Be Meaningfully Treated as a Distinct 
Class  
 Some readers may wonder why this Article treats Council refer-
rals as a unique class of referrals at all.153 Why not broaden this in-
quiry about the prosecutorial discretion to decline cases, to include 
                                                                                                                  
 151. The Prosecutor will certainly preliminarily examine the situation. Such an exami-
nation may make declining to prosecute even more politically unpalatable, as tremendous 
crimes might be unearthed. The Prosecutor will need to explain why she is declining, and 
she will face the possibility that the PTC will reverse her decision and request her to re-
consider. Doing so may increase the costs for the Security Council associated with referring 
a situation to the ICC.   
 152. See YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
22 (2014); Anthony Banbury, Opinion, I Love the U.N., but It Is Failing, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/opinion/sunday/i-love-the-un-but-
it-is-failing.html?_r=0. 
 153. Indeed, Leslie Vinjamuri argues that the ICC has extensive authority without 
having narrow or intermediate authority in both Security Council and proprio motu refer-
rals alike. See Vinjamuri, supra note 43, at 279. 
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State self-referrals that the Prosecutor might decline? First, this Ar-
ticle argues that Security Council referrals raise unique effectiveness 
and legitimacy concerns; as elaborated further below, not least be-
cause they simultaneously prohibit funding for the ICC’s work on 
Council referrals. Unlike States Parties, the Council incurs no actual 
costs when it refers situations to the ICC, even as it receives the ben-
efit of appearing to have addressed a particular situation. Its refer-
rals of non-consenting States to the ICC also raise concerns about 
extending the authority of the Court absent enforcement power of a 
kind not present in State self-referrals. In addition, the Prosecutor 
already has declined to move beyond a preliminary examination in 
State self-referrals.154 However, this is not so in the case of the two 
Council referrals of non-Member States Parties.  
 Some readers may object that two Council referrals is too small a 
class from which to generalize about future actions. To this point, it 
is important to recall that this Article examines the possible wisdom 
of declination, but does not argue that the Prosecutor should decline 
every Council referral. In addition, while Libya and the Sudan were 
indeed distinguishable from each other and other ICC cases in many 
ways, they do share the Council-driven characteristics mentioned 
above—they lack funding and the Council has not supported the 
Court’s actions.   
 Relatedly, some might argue that the class of independent proprio 
motu investigations raise more concerns than do Council referrals, 
initiated as they are by a single person, and not vetted by a multi-
member, longstanding international authority with a mandate to 
preserve international peace and security. The Prosecutor’s unilat-
eral use of discretion can indeed compromise the legitimacy and ef-
fectiveness of the ICC in various ways. As mentioned above, however, 
proprio motu referrals have already received tremendous attention in 
literature. In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s required approval of 
prosecutorial-initiated investigations and prosecutions diminishes 
concerns about a rogue prosecutor.155 But most importantly, the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor’s goals (and motives) in opening proprio motu 
investigations are better aligned with the long-term goals of the ICC 
than are the goals of the multi-member Security Council organ. The 
Prosecutor not only has an intimate understanding of the budget of 
the ICC, but she also has an incentive to use her discretion effectively 
                                                                                                                  
 154. For example, the Prosecutor has initiated preliminary examinations and contin-
ued such examinations for long periods of time without opening an investigation. Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities 2015, supra note 90, at 26-51. Indeed, four prelimi-
nary examinations have been open for five to eleven years; Colombia has been open since 
2004, Afghanistan since 2007, Guinea since 2009, and Nigeria since 2010. Id. at 26, 32, 40. 
 155. See Danner, supra note 27, at 518. 
2016]  WEAPONS OF THE WEAK 303 
  
to maintain her position in a system of justice respected for its fair-
ness and independence by as many mandate holders as possible.156  
4.   Declination Is Consistent with the Object and Purpose of the 
Rome Statute 
 Others may argue that it would be irresponsible for the Prosecutor 
to decline to investigate a Council referral—that to do so would de-
feat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, representing the 
Prosecutor’s “failure to respect the legal limits set by the mandate 
providers [which] would undermine the legitimacy of [the ICC] and 
may lead to a legal or political backlash against them.”157 The argu-
ment might continue, where the Council succeeds in agreeing that 
there is a threat to international peace and security, there will likely 
also be international crimes.158 The Prosecutor’s failure to proceed in 
such a situation could undermine the ICC’s objective. Alternately, the 
Prosecutor’s expansion of the conception of the interests of justice to 
decline to prosecute in such a situation will open the Court to even 
more claims of bias. At the same time, however, and as alluded to the 
Prosecutor’s Policy on Case Selection, it should be recalled that the 
ICC is a court of limited resources. It simply cannot prosecute all 
cases. Discretion in case selection is necessary but also leaves the 
Prosecutor open to claims of bias. The Prosecutor has made it clear 
that the Office prefers to prosecute where there is jurisdiction and 
that her job is to pursue justice. But this does not necessarily pre-
clude her ability to decline a Council referral in the interests of jus-
tice—that the ICC will not be able to serve justice in these Council-
referred cases absent support from the Council is borne out by the 
referrals so far. 
 That the jurisdictional and enforcement constraints within which 
the Prosecutor must operate make it nearly impossible for the Prose-
cutor to avoid critiques of bias would not be a full vindication of a 
strategy of declination of a Council referral. In policy papers, the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor (OTP) has already necessarily defined a certain 
subset of cases that will be priority cases for the Office.159 These poli-
                                                                                                                  
 156. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Suprana-
tional Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 370 (1997); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 24, at 906. 
 157. SHANY, supra note 152, at 7.  
 158. It is important to note that a class of situations exists where there may in fact be a 
threat to international peace and security, but there may nonetheless not be a cognizable 
international crime that falls within the ICC’s jurisdiction. But this Article deals with 
broader cases, those in which there may well be triable offenses present.  
 159. Int’l Crim. Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and 
Prioritisation, (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-
Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9C3-FU4Z].  
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cy papers both help explain and informally limit the prosecutor’s dis-
cretion. Thus, in the case of declination, the Prosecutor might also 
wisely elaborate the ways that another unsupported Council referral 
will not serve the interests of justice. The OTP’s recent policy paper 
on case selection, has refined earlier policies in order to help the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor achieve success and to conserve resources.160 If 
the Prosecutor declines to exercise jurisdiction over a situation in a 
non-State Party in the interests of justice, it will certainly open the 
Office to criticism, but will also be consistent with the Office’s recent 
explicit focus on resources of the ICC and the need to focus on cases 
where success is possible.161 
 The Prosecutor can use her soft power, the power to explain her 
discretion to anticipate and respond to criticisms. She can explain 
that Council-referred cases will likely be nearly impossible to investi-
gate and prosecute—those that are in non-consenting non-States 
Parties with ongoing conflicts. That rationale and her decision may 
well be reviewed by the PTC.162 Not only will her assessment of the 
likelihood of success in Council referrals likely be important to the 
PTC, but the Prosecutor’s use of her soft power and her explanation 
of her reasons for inaction may be central to how successful she is in 
conveying to the Council the burdens the Council has placed on the 
ICC. The Prosecutor’s denial in the interests of justice must make it 
clear that prosecution is necessary (if, indeed, she finds it to be so), 
but that at present, without a show of more support from the inter-
national community, the ICC will not be able to proceed effectively.  
 Some readers will argue that the interests of justice never permit 
compromise, and that bad actors should be prosecuted, regardless of 
the cost to the institution. This consequentialist argument has some 
foundation in the Rome Statute, but this interpretation focuses on 
the utilitarian and expressive values of the Court’s prosecutions. As 
stated above, norms matter within this Article’s framework, but a 
                                                                                                                  
 160. Strategic Plan 2016, supra note 37, at 16, ¶ 36 (“The Office published its policy 
paper on preliminary examinations in November 2013. This policy clarifies the process and 
criteria applied by the Office in accordance with the Rome Statute in deciding on whether 
or not to open an investigation. Complementary to this policy, the Office is working on a 
case selection and case prioritisation policy which will clarify how the Office decides which 
cases to pursue once a situation has been opened for investigation. Two aspects are being 
considered within this policy: (1) how to identify cases that the Office should pursue, and (2) 
how to prioritise amongst those cases if the demands placed upon the Office exceed[] the Of-
fice’s resources. Subsequently, the Office will define its policy on how it proposes to end its 
involvement in a situation under investigation, the so-called: ‘exit strategy’ for situations.”). 
 161. See Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015, supra note 90, at 4. 
 162. But see, deGuzman, supra note 121, at 296 (“In fact, due to the malleability of the 
factor-based approach to assessing gravity as well as the ‘interests of justice,’ a claim that 
the prosecutor adheres to ex ante standards for selection decisions may actually undermine 
the Court’s efforts to build legitimacy.”). 
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starting point for this analysis is the reality that the ICC is a court of 
limited jurisdiction, which requires the ICC necessarily to weigh the 
likelihood of success of prosecution. Also, to respond to consequential-
ist concerns, as mentioned above, diplomats and politicians have al-
ready increasingly discussed establishing ad hoc tribunals to fill gaps 
in the Rome Statute framework, so gaps resulting from prosecutorial 
declination may be filled in other ways.163 
 At any rate, declination need not mean that crimes go unpun-
ished. International criminal law scholars agree that it is increasing-
ly likely that the Council will establish ad hoc tribunals, or regional 
tribunals to address some threats to international peace and security, 
as part of the regime of international criminal law.164 Whether or not 
the return to ad hoc tribunals is a good development for the interna-
tional criminal law regime, the Prosecutor may treat the renewed 
interest in ad hoc tribunals as an opportunity for her to shift the 
burden to the Council, and to use her discretion to limit the situa-
tions the ICC pursues. 
5.   Effects on Institutional Relations with the UN Security Council  
 Informed readers might also be concerned that the ICC cannot 
afford to alienate the Council by declining a referral. After all, many 
of the successes of the ad hoc tribunals in securing custody over miss-
ing defendants were contingent on the behind-the-scenes coercive 
pressure of key members of the Council. But the Council has simply 
not been willing to offer support for ICC prosecutions and, as this Ar-
ticle elaborates,165 that failure has been costly for the ICC, which 
needs to move forward conservatively at this point in its life cycle. A 
related concern is that an alienated Council would retaliate by delay-
ing different Court proceedings for a year. Indeed, one indirect form 
of support the Council has provided166 the Court has been to decline 
to defer ongoing proceedings when requested to do so by the AU.167 It 
is certainly a risk, as the Council is a powerful, longstanding organ. 
But as the Kadi case in the European Union, demonstrates there has 
been indirect review of Council decisions and processes.168 A retalia-
                                                                                                                  
 163. H.R. Res. 269, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 164. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 69, at 1067-68; Stephens, supra note 69, at 504. 
 165. See, e.g., infra Table 3.  
 166. Only narrowly—the vote was close on whether to defer.  
 167. See ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59, at 67, ¶ 38. 
 168. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l 
Found. v. Council of the European Union & Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 2008 E.C.R. 
I-06351; see Cora True-Frost, The Development of Individual Standing in International 
Security, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1183, 1187 n.8 (2011) [hereinafter True-Frost, Development 
of Individual Standing] (“In the Kadi decision, the European Court of Justice annulled a 
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tion from the Council could be costly to the Council, too, however, as 
past practice has demonstrated that the Council has sometimes ad-
justed its procedures in response to tremendous backlash from  
member States.169  
6.   Effects on Relations with States Parties 
 The ICC has the greatest geographic and temporal reach of any 
international criminal tribunal to date, even as the Rome Statute 
gives it limited jurisdiction.170 There is a concern that a denial by the 
ICC Prosecutor of a Council referral would cause some Rome Statute 
States Parties to reconsider their membership in the ICC. At the 
same time, States Parties ratified the Rome Statute knowing that 
many powerful States were not joining the Rome Statute framework. 
Universal membership remains an aspiration, and there are frequent 
threats of exit, but no State has yet left.  
7.   Council Referrals Uncoupled by Its Support Test the Limits of 
the Expressive Value of International Criminal Law 
 A central theoretical assumption behind the Prosecutor declining 
a referral is that there are limits to the expressive value of a prosecu-
tion at this point in the Court’s life. Some would respond, however, 
that any Council referral, regardless of its outcomes, has value. 
Council referrals, the argument would continue, promote and diffuse 
the norms of international criminal law, and the Prosecutor is there-
fore duty-bound to investigate and prosecute if there is sufficient evi-
dence. In other words, because the norms of ICL are supported re-
gardless of the immediate outcome of a particular situation, even 
when the indictee remains at large, there is expressive value in pro-
ceeding. As demonstrated in Section IV.B., infra, there is some evi-
dence to support this view, but it is not a settled matter. Earlier in 
the ICC’s existence, when the prospect of Council enforcement of a 
referral was still viable, the view that the ICC’s long-term effective-
ness was not contingent on its ability to enforce in Council referred-
situations was more persuasive.  
                                                                                                                  
European Council Regulation implementing targeted sanctions on the grounds that it vio-
lated ‘the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard, and the right to effective 
judicial review of those rights.’ ”). 
 169. See Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found., 2008 E.C.R. I-06351 at ¶ 225; 
ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE 
OF LAW (2012). 
 170. “South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress, said in a state-
ment over the weekend that the International Criminal Court was not ‘useful’ to prosecute 
crimes against humanity because membership is voluntary.” Onishi, supra note 111. 
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 At this point in the ICC’s existence, however, the ICC faces nu-
merous challenges. Recognition from the Council is no longer one of 
them; rather follow-through from all Council members is critical.  
8.   Declination Could Affect the Deterrence Goals of the Court 
 Related, a concern is what impact declination would have on de-
terrence. Whether the ICC actually deters is the subject of an active 
debate,171 but there are multiple anecdotal accounts of the deterrence 
effects of ICC prosecutions on various leaders.172 The analysis below 
of the effectiveness of Council referrals to the ICC preliminarily indi-
cates that Council referrals have yielded prosecutions that have been 
actively undermined by traveling, or at-large, high-profile indictees.  
 Which is more damaging to the deterrence effect of the Court, 
frustrated prosecutions or the ICC Prosecutor’s declination in sim-
ilar situations? Although prosecutions need not result in convic-
tions in order to have a deterrent effect, to the extent the Prosecu-
tion can either inculcate Council support for its referrals at this 
phase in the Court’s development or avoid the dilemma entirely 
through declination, this might help ameliorate the issue of at-
large defendants in Council-referred matters. The relationship be-
tween law and politics is notoriously complicated, but the ICC is 
an institution of law that is uniquely affected and constrained by 
the political whims of the Council. This concern is also related to 
the expressive value of the prosecutions.  
 What follows is an exploration of how declination might help the 
effectiveness of the Court.  
IV.   USING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION COULD IMPROVE THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICC AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
COUNCIL 
 The multiple contradictions and stalemates of Council ICC-
referral practice will likely continue to create difficulties for the ICC 
to effectively promote criminal law norms; resolve specific cases; and 
                                                                                                                  
 171. See generally Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals 
Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (2006) (finding 
that international criminal tribunals have low deterrent effect because targets of prosecu-
tion likely already face informal sanctions such as death, imprisonment, or torture). 
 172. See Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter 
Atrocity?, 70 INT’L ORG. 443, 449 (2014) (providing the example of two rebel groups in Co-
lombia, and how both “have published internal documents assessing the likelihood of pros-
ecution by the ICC or domestic courts. ICC investigations, indictments, and convictions or 
those triggered by complementarity are likely to encourage actual or potential perpetrators 
to reassess the risks of punishment—[often relative to impunity]—and to moderate  
their behavior”).  
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to focus on strengthening relationships with mandate holders of the 
Rome Statute.173 This Article assumes that in the short-term, the 
Council is unlikely to alter its ICC-referral practices, the earnest ar-
guments of international law scholars and diplomats notwithstand-
ing.174 The ICC will almost certainly receive another Council referral 
in the future, however. In this Section, I analyze the various impacts 
of the ICC’s relationship with the Council on its own effectiveness, by 
interrogating multiple related goals. Under this framework, the five 
“generic” goals of international courts are: (1) norm support, (2) re-
solving international disputes and problems, (3) regime support, (4) 
legitimizing public authority, and (5) idiosyncratic goals.175  
 Core effectiveness issues in the relationship between the Council 
and Court are framed here for future analysis; a preliminary analysis 
of how the Council is assisting the Court in achieving its goals is set 
forth. The goals analyzed here are inspired by a goal-oriented concep-
tual framework of effectiveness, which focuses specifically on the 
normative expectations of the States Parties that formed the tribu-
nal, the mandate holders.176   
 This conceptual framework takes us beyond viewing effectiveness 
of international tribunals merely as successful prosecutions, judg-
ment-compliance, or the effects of the court on State conduct.177 In-
                                                                                                                  
 173. In March 23, 2006, the Prosecutor stated, “Darfur presents new challenges for the 
Court. The security situation in Darfur means that . . . . [n]o one can conduct a judicial 
investigation in Darfur.” SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 49. 
 174. The Council is not entirely impervious to arguments for change. For example, the 
Council has reformed many of its procedures in response to judicial and political pressure. 
See, e.g., True-Frost, Development of Individual Standing, supra note 168, at 1207. The 
Council was expanded in 1965 from six to ten elected members. Still, in recent years, the 
Council has remained unresponsive to arguments for reform of the structure of the Coun-
cil. See sources sited supra note 121. 
 175. SHANY, supra note 152, at 44. Shany examines alternatives to the goal-oriented 
approach to measuring effectiveness, including, for example, the open system approach, 
which he rejects for failing to conduct “a more purposive inquiry into judicial conduct.” Id. 
at 15. He also rejects the process-oriented model and strategic constituency model because 
of the multiplicity of constituencies in international courts. Id. at 16. It should be noted 
that the concept of effectiveness is distinguishable from efficiency or cost-effectiveness. 
Given the jurisdictional and enforcement constraints the ICC faces, focusing on the expec-
tations of the mandate holders at this point seems wise. An action is effective if it “accom-
plishes its specific objective aim.” Id. at 14. 
 176. SHANY, supra note 152, at 7 (“[A]s a matter of good policy, [courts should seek to 
accommodate] the normative expectations of their mandate providers.”). The goals of a 
broad and varied range of constituencies of the ICC might also be considered, including 
NGOs, civil society, victims of crimes, and potential perpetrators of crimes.   
 177. Id. at 4, 15. In order to measure whether goals have been attained, Shany rec-
ommends using operational categories and performance indicators. Id. at 20 (using 
structural indicators as outcome predictors including: legal powers (determined by juris-
diction, ancillary powers, how binding judicial decisions are, applicable law, etc.); per-
sonnel capacity (determined by number of judges, employees, legal-assistance proce-
dures, and actual and perceived quality of personnel); resources (determined by short 
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stead, this approach to understanding effectiveness also considers 
the longer-term systemic contribution of courts to development gov-
ernance. Although this effectiveness framework is primarily descrip-
tive, it also incorporates normative assessment of courts. So, whether 
a court affected States in a “desirable” way may be considered in  
assessing effectiveness.178  
 State parties to the Rome Statute agreed to establish the ICC to 
work towards the goals of promoting internalization of norms, devel-
oping ICL norms, ending impunity, achieving deterrence, resolving 
disputes by promoting peace and security, promoting victim satisfac-
tion, and establishing a historical record of the atrocities.179 The goals 
of the ICC also include promoting domestic proceedings against viola-
tors of ICL and legitimizing the application of ICL by conveying a 
message of condemnation.180 The history of the ICC’s relationship 
with the Council, detailed above, hints at the mismatch between the 
goals of the framers of the Rome Statute and the outcomes of the cur-
rent relationship—this Section enumerates those areas of mismatch. 
In a system within which the Prosecutor must balance innumerable 
practical constraints: staffing, resources, and the need for State coop-
eration in order to enforce; the Prosecutor’s relationship with the 
Council highlights some of the most prominent international peace 
and security concerns. The various domains of effectiveness are  
unpacked here.  
A.   Security Council Involvement with the ICC Somewhat Helps 
Support International Criminal Law Norms, but Mostly Has Not 
Helped Resolve International Disputes  
 The Security Council’s first referral to the ICC offered its recogni-
tion and increased the ICC’s political legitimacy among some States 
Parties. The Security Council’s referral of the situation in the Sudan 
contributed to ICL norms, in some ways, as it gave the ICC the op-
                                                                                                                  
and long-term budgets, facilities, other tangible resources); structural independence 
(determined by conditions in place to ensure that the court and its members are free 
from influence of other actors and stakeholders); usage potential (determined by condi-
tions influencing how much the court will be used, propensity of Member States to liti-
gate, relevance of problem area and court’s applicable norms to the problems and dis-
putes arising in occupying States); reputation (determined by perceived independence, 
impartiality, legitimacy, and effectiveness); and relations with other institutions (deter-
mined by and reflected in the court’s capacity to harness domestic or international insti-
tutions to promote its objectives and implements its outputs)). 
 178. At the same time, Shany concedes that the leverage of mandate holders controls 
finances and constrains the independence of the Council. Id. at 33.  
 179. Shany, supra note 13, at 239. 
 180. Id. at 230-36.  
310  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:261 
   
portunity to indict individuals it found most responsible for the grave 
crimes there.  
 National-level awareness of the need to hold accountable those 
responsible for the Darfur atrocities has been facilitated by the 
Council’s referral and the ICC’s prosecution, arguably going some 
way towards the people in Sudan’s internalization of ICL norms. In 
addition, although President Al-Bashir has eluded apprehension by 
States Parties, his indictment helped encourage the African Union to 
pressure the Sudan to pursue criminal accountability for atrocities 
that have occurred in Darfur.181 In addition, since the Security Coun-
cil referral, the Sudan has set up structures for accountability, 
though they fall far short of international standards.182 As mentioned 
above, the Security Council refused the African Union’s requests to 
defer proceedings against Al-Bashir and in the Kenya situation, alt-
hough the vote was close.183 As elaborated below, the ICC’s indict-
ment of Al-Bashir has also, however, exacerbated concerns of selec-
tive justice, and the Council has in many ways undermined the ICC’s 
efforts to end impunity, deter atrocity crimes, help States internalize 
norms, and develop international legal norms through its failure to 
support the ICC.  
 The Council’s response to the second referral of Libya in 2011 has 
been complicated. Depending on how the trial of Al-Senussi proceeds, 
the referral may help promote norm internalization at the domestic 
level. The African Court of Human Rights issued an order to Libya to 
require Gaddafi to see his lawyer in May 2013.184 The National Tran-
sitional Council (NTC) has agreed that it is bound under the Council 
resolution to cooperate with the ICC,185 but it did not surrender in-
dictees to ICC custody, claiming instead that it could try them do-
mestically.186 Although this claim was disputed by the Defense and 
                                                                                                                  
 181. Id. at 250. 
 182. Kate Allan, Prosecution and Peace: A Role for Amnesty Before the ICC?, 39 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 239, 273 (2011) (“In response to the referral, the Sudanese government cre-
ated the Darfur Special Criminal Court to prosecute crimes against humanity in June  
2005 . . . . [I]t soon became apparent that the Court would not meet the test of genuineness.”). 
 183. See SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 82-83. 
 184. Libya and the International Criminal Court: Questions and Answers,  
HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (May 2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ 
related_material/QA_Libya_ICC_May_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF2M-HPPJ]. 
 185. UN Security Council: Press for Cooperation with ICC, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 
1, 2011, 5:04 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/01/un-security-council-press-
cooperation-icc [https://perma.cc/ZF9D-KT39] (“The NTC is legally bound to cooperate with 
the ICC, and promised to do so in a letter to the court . . . in April [2011].”). 
 186. In August 2015, the domestic courts in Libya sentenced both Al-Senussi and Gad-
dafi to death. How Libya Became the International Criminal Court’s Latest Failure, THE 
CONVERSATION (Aug. 6, 2015, 8:18 AM), http://theconversation.com/how-libya-became-the-
international-criminal-courts-latest-failure-45389 [https://perma.cc/J5L7-APL4]. 
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the Office for Victims of the ICC,187 Libya was successful in persuad-
ing the ICC that the case of Al-Senussi should be tried there, even as 
it was determined that the case of Gaddafi should proceed before  
the ICC.188  
 Instances of the Council’s lack of support for the ICC’s promotion 
of international criminal law are numerous, however. The Council’s 
capacity to reach agreement is arguably at its weakest when it is del-
egating authority to a third-party like the ICC, a court over which it 
has little control. Although initial Security Council agreement for a 
referral is difficult to obtain, experience has also proven that the 
Council’s support for the referrals is rarely substantial. The Council’s 
first referral to the ICC supported, at least in theory, the application 
of ICL to massive crimes. Yet in its referrals, the Council famously 
prohibited the General Assembly and the UN from providing funding 
to support ICC investigations and prosecutions.189 For example, alt-
hough the PTC of the ICC confirmed the Prosecutor’s arrest warrant 
for President Omar Al-Bashir in 2009,190 the Council has still not 
added Omar Al-Bashir to its targeted sanctions list. Indeed, as of De-
cember 2016, the Council has never sanctioned any ICC indictee.191  
 The Security Council does not advance ICL when its members 
host ICC indictees. The ICC has used Article 87(7) to report Rome 
Statute States Parties that have violated their international criminal 
law obligations to the Council, hoping for enforcement action, but the 
Council has not acted in response. It does not advance ICL when the 
Council does not sanction Rome Statute members that have, for ex-
ample, invited Al-Bashir to visit.192 
 Although Libya has amended its domestic law to provide amnesty 
for atrocities that occurred during the transition,193 and the ICC has 
issued findings of non-cooperation against Libya since it has failed to 
surrender Gaddafi and documents to the custody of the ICC, the 
                                                                                                                  
 187. Libya and the International Criminal Court: Questions and Answers, supra note 
184, at 7-8 (noting that the ICC issued an order requiring OPCD layers to visit Gaddafi 
while in detention).  
 188. Case Information Sheet, INT’L CRIM. COURT (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/GaddafiEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYR8-KSAA] (noting 
details and case information on Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi). 
 189. David Kaye et al., The Council and the Court: Improving Security Council Support 
of the International Criminal Court, INT’L JUST. CLINIC 21 (May 2013). 
 190. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.  
 191. See supra Table 1. 
 192. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 86. 
 193. Libya: Amend New Special Procedures Law-Reject Impunity for Serious Crimes, 
HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (May 11, 2012, 12:39 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/ 
05/11/libya-amend-new-special-procedures-law [https://perma.cc/LMA7-9TDB]. 
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appearance for defendants in the Sudanese and Libyan cases are the 
lowest of the matters before the ICC.197 The numbers of outstanding 
arrest warrants in Council referrals also surpass those of proprio mo-
tu and self-referred cases to the ICC.198 Despite these inherent chal-
lenges, Council referrals also lack accompanying funding. In referrals 
of non-consenting States with active conflicts, unique issues related 
to the safety of witnesses and investigators arise, and the costs of ef-
fective investigations and prosecutions may therefore be higher. In 
the cases from these referrals, the ICC’s already limited capacity to 
secure jurisdiction over defendants from these non-States Parties is 
arguably even more challenged.  
 Any future United Nations Security Council referrals will likely be 
of situations in non-State Parties to the Rome Statute. Such referrals 
are also likely to be of active conflict situations, which can be more dif-
ficult for the ICC to safely and reliably investigate and prosecute.199  
 Although enforcement in the short-term is not vital to effective-
ness of the ICC, Council-referred situations may very well damage 
perceptions that the ICC is effective. Were the ICC able to work, un-
supported—but also unimpeded—by the Council, the prospects for 
the ICC to effectively build norms and resolve disputes among the 
community of States Parties might well be greater.  
B.   The Security Council Does Not Help the ICC Support the Regime 
of International Criminal Law (ICL) 
 As the Council has not only failed—over and over again—to take 
action to enforce warrants of the ICC in referred situations, but also 
has allowed countries that hosted Al-Bashir to do so without conse-
quence, the Council damages the ability of the ICC to support the 
regime of ICL. When permanent Council member China, and elected 
Council members, Chad and Nigeria, invited indictee Al-Bashir for 
State visits, they again deeply disrupted the ability of the ICC to 
support the regime of ICL.200 Of course, these instances of lack of 
support must be weighed against the initial referrals and the times 
that the Council has indirectly supported the ICC by refusing (nar-
rowly at times) to defer proceedings, but overall, the Security Council 
has not helped support the ICC’s ICL regime.  
                                                                                                                  
reliance on varied forms of evidence, will help avoid the recurrence of such  
challenging situations.”). 
 197. See supra Table 3. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Strategic Plan 2016, supra note 37, at 14, ¶ 30. 
 200. See Negotiated Draft Relationship Agreement Between the International Crimi-
nal Court and the United Nations, supra note 81. 
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 Unlike many international courts, the ICC is not a subsidiary or-
gan of a formal international organization. Its mandate is not to sup-
port the UN system, but to prosecute the most atrocious crimes 
where there is the greatest risk of impunity from States unable or 
unwilling to prosecute.201 The Assembly of States Parties’ capacity to 
restrict the ICC’s budget or to alter the provisions of the Rome Stat-
ute constrain the ICC’s independence.202 Analyzing international 
courts generally, Helfer and Slaughter reasonably argue that inter-
national courts seek to maintain the support of their mandate hold-
ers which leads to a certain constrained independence of internation-
al courts—this is also true for the ICC—and unsupported Council 
referrals uniquely test the ICC’s capacity to secure cooperation. 
 In sum, at this point in time, the Council does not, on balance, 
help the ICC support the regime of international criminal law, but 
the Prosecutor might be able to shift the status quo using her weapon 
of prosecutorial discretion.  
V.   COUNCIL REFERRALS CREATE UNIQUE LEGITIMACY CHALLENGES 
FOR THE ICC 
 Legitimacy is a notoriously broad concept, and one that is exten-
sively intertwined with the concept of effectiveness.203 “[T]he building 
blocks of judicial effectiveness also constitute [those] of judicial legit-
imacy.”204 Indeed, as Professor Beetham notes, “[i]t is now a well-
                                                                                                                  
 201. Shany, supra note 13, at 237. 
 202. See id. at 241.  
 203. In the case of the ICC, legitimacy refers to the beliefs of those actors involved in 
the process of international criminal law that the legal institution ought to be obeyed. Ac-
cording to David Beetham’s noted definition, sociological legitimacy has the following com-
ponents: 1) legality or rule conformity, 2) normative validity, and 3) appropriate actions. 
BEETHAM, supra note 25, at xiii (“Rules . . . are well grounded in normative beliefs accepted 
by the population . . . .”). Here I mean sociological legitimacy, which includes mandate 
holders’ perceptions of the ICC’s neutrality and legal and political independence. Interna-
tional institutions must mediate multiple contests over moral and political legitimacy in 
order to optimize their sociological legitimacy. Sociological legitimacy is a “multi-
dimensional concept.” Sociological legitimacy, as contrasted with political philosophical 
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Habermasian legitimacy. (“[T]he starting point for [analysis of] social scientific . . . [legiti-
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their own terms, not those we ourselves may endorse.”) Id. at xi; see also HURD, supra note 
25, at 7 (“ ‘Legitimacy,’ as I use the term, refers to an actor’s normative belief that a rule or 
institution ought to be obeyed.”). 
 204. SHANY, supra note 152, at 150-51. The concept of legitimacy is notoriously slip-
pery. Understanding sociological legitimacy requires “a discursive analysis of the content 
and rationale of people’s beliefs.” BEETHAM, supra note 25, at xi. The difference between 
legitimacy in State or non-State systems is substantial. Rules are based on normative be-
liefs of a particular population. International organizations are perceived as legitimate 
when they conform to their treaties’ legal requirements which were determined by Member 
States mandate holders; and when they “perform effectively in fulfilling the common pur-
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established fact in social and political science that leaders and au-
thorities are effective to the extent that they are perceived as having 
legitimate authority and acting in accordance with prevailing norms 
of appropriate conduct.”205  
 For the ICC, the interrelationship between legitimacy and effec-
tiveness is fundamental—mandate holders’ perceptions of the ICC’s 
legitimacy affect their willingness to cooperate with the ICC. Rea-
sonable legal arguments for the Prosecutor’s case selection aside, this 
Article has described how according to many States Parties, the ICC 
has been selectively enforcing ICL. 
 Professor Shany argues that one goal of the ICC is to legitimize 
ICL norms by conveying a message of condemnation and ensuring 
that its legal proceedings are not only legitimate, but also fair.206 Ju-
dicial systems are generally perceived by States to be more legitimate 
when they are independent of politics. Yet, by design, the ICC’s de-
pendence on State cooperation renders political concerns necessary to 
its investigations and enforcement of international criminal law, and 
so the ICC continues to be bedeviled by allegations of bias. The ICC’s 
limited jurisdiction and reliance on State cooperation renders it vul-
nerable to criticisms of politicized case selection,207 but the ICC is ar-
guably the most vulnerable to criticism of politicized cases when it 
receives referrals from the political Security Council body, including 
its three non-States Parties, veto-wielding, permanent members.  
 The Council’s involvement with the ICC, although legally permit-
ted under the Rome Statute, thus raises unique selective justice legit-
imacy concerns for an institution that already faces significant chal-
lenges. Ten years after the Council’s first referrals, it is less clear 
whether its referrals have had a legitimacy-enhancing effect as more 
States, including Council members, continue to flout the ICC’s rul-
ings.208 For example, the AU’s backlash to the ICC’s indictment of Al-
Bashir in the Sudan has arguably negatively affected both the nor-
mative validity of the ICC and the willingness of States to “comply 
                                                                                                                  
poses for which they were established” and according to “procedures accepted as fair.” Id. 
at 271-72. Finally, international organizations are recognized as legitimate to the extent 
States comply with their decisions and refrain from “acting in ways which manifestly flout 
the institution’s rules.” Id. at 272. Source and procedural legitimacy are forms of legitimacy.  
 205. BEETHAM, supra note 25, at xi (quoting J.T. JOST & B. MAJOR, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF LEGITIMACY 4 (2001)). 
 206. Shany, supra note 13, at 236-37. 
 207. See Sarah M.H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The 
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941, 963 (2010). 
 208. See BOSCO, supra note 83, at 114 (quoting Christian Wenaweser). One diplomat 
was noted as stating, “If the Prosecutor cannot start proprio motu investigations due to 
financial constraints but continues with [Security Council] referrals then the independence 
of the ICC is at risk.” Id. at 172 (emphasis added). 
316  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:261 
   
with decisional outcomes, or refrain from acting in ways which mani-
festly flout the institution’s rules,” a component of legitimacy which 
Beetham calls “performative endorsement.”209  
A.   Lack of Consent, Conflicting Obligations, and Perceptions of Bi-
as: The AU 
 Pointing to the all-African docket, African Union members have 
claimed that Africa has been disproportionately targeted and have 
particularly declaimed the ICC’s indictments of sitting heads of state. 
The Office of the Prosecutor has been the primary target of many of 
the bias allegations; it is the Prosecutor’s Office that is responsible 
for taking the first steps to implement the ICC’s mandate. 210 When 
the ICC indicted the Sudan’s head of state, Omar Al-Bashir,211 the 
AU took umbrage with the idea that a State not party to the Rome 
Statute, could be viewed to have waived sovereign immunity.212 
When the AU later requested the UN Security Council to defer the 
case against Al-Bashir, the Council indirectly—and perhaps uninten-
tionally—supported the ICC by ignoring this request.213 The Council’s 
                                                                                                                  
 209. BEETHAM, supra note 25, at 272; see Laurence Juma, Unclogging the Wheels: How 
the Shift from Politics to Law Affects Africa’s Relationship with the International System, 
23 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305 (2014). 
 210. The AU has issued a number of decisions alleging inappropriate targeting of Africa. 
See African Union [AU], African Union Decision Regarding Its Relationship With the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC), AU Doc. Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (Oct. 12, 2013); President 
Uhuru Hits out at the West Over ICC, DAILY NATION (Oct. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-Uhuru-stinging-attack-at-the-West-and-ICC--Speech/-/1056/ 
2029518/-/v0whudz/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/6JMS-4QV7] (alleging that the ICC is 
“skewed,” “condescending,” “biased,” and “selective”); African Union [AU], Decision Regarding 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), AU Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) (July 3, 2009). 
 211. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ 
CR2009_01514.PDF. 
 212. For allegations that the ICC has violated sovereign immunity see International 
Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Twenty-First Report of the Prosecutor of the In-
ternational Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 
(2005), ¶ 30 (June 15, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/21st-report-of-the-
Prosecutor-to-the-UNSC-on-Dafur_%20Sudan.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS58-3C8Q]; Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Ninth Report of the Prosecutor of the In-
ternational Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 
1593 (2005), ¶¶ 32, 39 (June 7, 2005), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B97B3A9C-
0C83-4884-881C-70C1C1EEEA53/280448/9th_UNSCReport_Eng1.pdf; see also Juma, su-
pra note 209, at 305. 
 213. African Union [AU], Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and The In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC), at ¶ 3, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XXI) (May 26-27, 
2013) (“[The Assembly] DEEPLY REGRETS that the request by the African Union (AU) to 
the United Nations (UN) Security Council to defer the proceedings initiated against Presi-
dent Omar Al Bashir of The Sudan and Senior State Official of Kenya, in accordance with 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on deferral of 
cases by the UN Security Council, has not been acted upon; REAFFIRMS that Member 
States such as the Republic of Chad that had welcomed President Omar Al Bashir of The 
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unwillingness to defer ICC proceedings against the head of state in 
the Sudan struck many States Parties, especially members of the 
AU, as unfair. The legitimacy concerns raised by AU States regard-
ing the ICC targeting Africa are in part attributable to the Prosecu-
tor’s decision to pursue a sitting head of state, but are also related to 
a core concern inherent in any Security Council referral of a non-
State Party, like Libya. Most recently, South Africa formally notified 
the UN of its intentions to withdraw from the Rome Statute in Octo-
ber 2016,214 as did Gambia and Burundi.215 
 Aside from possibly self-serving allegations of bias by the AU, 
what does the relationship between the Council and the ICC have to 
do with States Parties’ perceptions of the ICC’s legitimacy? From one 
perspective, the relationship between the ICC and the Council acts as 
a balance—ensuring that individuals from any UN member State 
could, in principle if not in fact—face criminal process for their ac-
tions creating threats to international peace and security.   
 From many Rome Statute and non-Rome Statute States’ view-
points, however, rather than strengthening a growing global percep-
tion that international criminal law norms will be fairly applied to 
hold violators accountable, cases resulting from the Council’s refer-
rals just bolster perceptions of ICC double standards. The concern 
regarding double standards accompanies any political Security Coun-
cil action or inaction—Council members have a marked tendency to 
favor their allies, and it is difficult to reach consensus on action 
against their allies. The political limitations and strengths of all 
Council action are indeed inherent in the design of the organ itself.216 
The ICC, however, is a legal institution, unlike the Council, and is 
accordingly intended to be impartial and neutral. So, too, the en-
forcement of criminal law is intended to be impartial. The Court’s 
involvement with the Council, therefore, opens it to unique allega-
tions of bias. If more AU members follow through with their claims 
that they will withdraw from the ICC217 and only Latin American, 
European, and Asian countries remain, the broad legitimacy that  
                                                                                                                  
Sudan did so in conformity with the decisions of the Assembly and therefore, should not  
be penalized . . . .”). 
 214. See Niko Pavlopoulos, South Africa’s Withdrawal: A Lesson Learned?, EJIL: 
TALK! (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/south-africas-withdrawal-a-lesson-learned/ 
[https://perma.cc/5S9B-VEB6]. 
 215. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Burundi: Withdrawal, 
C.N.805.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 28, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
CN/2016/CN.805.2016-Eng.pdf. 
 216. The Council lacks representation from Africa, the Middle East, or South America 
in its permanent membership. 
 217. See Pizzi, supra note 11. 
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the ICC has enjoyed in international criminal law matters will be  
deeply endangered. 
 Even as it exempts a select group of powerful States—namely, the 
three permanent Council-Member States (P3)218 that have veto au-
thority from the Court’s jurisdiction—the Council’s involvement in 
the jurisdiction of the ICC also brings non-consenting States within 
the ICC’s jurisdiction. Legal formalists might point out that the UN 
Charter applies to all States, so as a matter of international law, all 
States are already subject to the Council’s political power. A norm-
based defense of the Council’s ability to refer non-State Parties is 
that the Rome Statute broadens the group of States, albeit not to in-
clude the P3, to which ICL norms will apply. Council-referrals thus 
overcome the understandable concern of ICL advocates that consent 
should not be the sole basis for the application of ICL against wrong-
doers. Many ICC mandate holders, though, as well as many members 
of global civil society, see the Council’s connection to the ICC as en-
hancing the concern that the ICC—and its Prosecutor—are political 
tools of the most powerful countries and the lesson that justice will 
apply to all States except the P3—the United States, Russia,  
and China. 
 Indeed, the Council’s role in the ICC was largely a concession to 
the interests of the United States during the drafting of the Stat-
ute.219 This matters for many reasons, but especially here, for the 
costs to legitimacy and the resulting effects on the ICC’s ability to 
achieve its goals. Some readers may object that the political nature of 
the Council itself increases the legitimacy of its referrals—and there-
fore the Prosecutor should be compelled to investigate and prosecute 
these referrals. After all, in order to refer a situation, the Council 
must first reach agreement that there is a threat to international 
peace and security. The Council’s political debates about referring a 
situation to the ICC strengthen the perception that the situation 
merits attention. The resolutions accompanying these debates, how-
ever, have not seriously considered the ICC’s capacity to manage the 
resulting cases without accompanying enforcement power from the 
Council. It would thus appear that the Council’s involvement in the 
                                                                                                                  
 218. Jurisdiction would exist over Council P5 members who have allegedly committed 
crimes meeting the other standards on the territory of a Member State.  
 219. The ICC in the Security Council, GLOBAL POL’Y F., https://www.globalpolicy.org/ 
international-justice/the-international-criminal-court/icc-in-the-security-council-6-4.html 
[https://perma.cc/9JPJ-2S7W] (“Under threat of a US veto of all UN peacekeeping missions, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1422 in July 2002, granting Washington a twelve-
month blanket immunity from the ICC. The US again used its veto power and successfully 
renewed its immunity arrangement a year later.”). 
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ICC’s caseload does not necessarily increase perceptions of the ICC’s 
fairness and legitimacy.  
B.   The Rome System as the Primary Authority in International 
Criminal Law 
 Since 2002, the ICC has occupied an unparalleled position—it is 
the central institution in an international framework of ICL. Even as 
a relative newcomer to the network of international organizations, 
the ICC’s endorsement by 123 States, hundreds of NGOs, and wide-
spread initial buy-in is in many respects more inclusive and thorough 
than was the UN at its founding.  
 As an international tribunal, the ICC is understood to be more of a 
rule-bound institution than is the UN, renowned for its political and 
supra-legal action. The stories of the founding of the two internation-
al entities contributed to perceptions of their respective structural 
and source legitimacy.220 The negotiations leading to the ICC’s estab-
lishment are summarized supra in Part II. By contrast, it is well-
known that tremendous asymmetries of power gave birth to the UN’s 
Charter. The Council’s composition has been criticized since the mo-
ment of the UN’s conception; the need for Council reform emphasized 
in many fora.221 When the United States, United Kingdom, and Rus-
sia met at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, their vision of a new world gov-
ernment was one in which they would have sole responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security.222 The three powers later 
expanded their inner-circle membership to include China and 
France, but made it clear to the approximately forty-five States gath-
ered in San Francisco to discuss and ratify the UN Charter in June 
1945, that the permanent Council members’ veto power was non-
negotiable.223 Just three States in Africa attended this founding con-
ference, as the rest were still under the control of colonial powers. 
When the five permanent members of the Council made their veto 
                                                                                                                  
 220. BEETHAM, supra note 25, at 75 (“These various sources of legitimacy, both exter-
nal and internal to societies, are rooted in clearly distinguishable types of belief system, 
each with its own respective interpreters and mode of discourse. Among the most profound 
social changes are those marked by a shift in these belief systems that determine the 
source of legitimacy for a society’s rules of power: from religious to secular; from external 
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 221. See U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Securi-
ty and Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005), 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/followupreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QWT-BB8F]; 
see also Shany, supra note 13, at 226. 
 222. DAVID L. BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE 
MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 20-21 (2009). 
 223. Id. at 32, 36. 
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power a prerequisite to establishing the UN Charter, the New York 
Times noted that the community of States “reluctantly accepted the 
idea of virtual world dictatorship by the great powers.”224 Although 
the Council has evolved and adapted at the margins, even after de-
colonization, the end of the Cold War, and many other power shifts, 
its permanent membership has remained cemented as its core.  
 The move to apply law to atrocity famously attempts to cabin the 
politicization of conflict resolution. It is therefore not surprising that 
during the negotiations to establish the unprecedented ICC, States 
Parties were concerned about how best to establish and guard the 
political independence of the ICC. This concern was particularly 
acute among Southern members.225 Thus, the relationship between 
the ICC and the Security Council was a concern related to the inde-
pendence of the ICC for many States Parties in the negotiations lead-
ing to the Rome Statute. 
 States adopting the Rome Statute agreed to the Rome Statute’s 
explicit division between those States within the Rome framework 
and those outside it. However, Council-referrals further affect this 
division in two ways: first, by sweeping within the ICC’s jurisdiction 
even States that have neither ratified the Rome Statute nor violated 
States Parties’ territory, and second, by mostly exempting Council 
members with veto power from possible ICC jurisdiction. Of course, 
States Parties knew that some members of the P5 would not join the 
Rome Statute, so they arguably anticipated this double standard. At 
the same time, States Parties arguably did not anticipate that the 
Security Council would agree to refer situations to the Court while 
simultaneously refusing to provide the resources and support neces-
sary to help the Court proceed in investigating and prosecuting in 
these non-States Parties’ territories. As the latter part of this Article 
has argued, the relationship with the Council does not, on balance, 
strengthen the ICC.   
VI.   SELECT TRADEOFFS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ICC PROSECUTOR 
DECLINING A FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL  
 This Article has investigated why the Prosecutor might wisely 
consider declining a Council referral in the interests of justice. Mak-
ing such a declination might increase the capacity of the Court to fo-
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 225. See ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59 (quoting various southern diplomats on 
the Security Council’s relationship with the ICC). 
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cus its resources and to send a message to the Council that it should 
support the progress of the cases resulting from its referrals.226 
 Saying no to the Council is no simple matter for the Prosecutor, 
not least because the PTC will review the decision and the Council 
has the power to interfere with the Court’s work by deferring its ac-
tive cases. If the Prosecutor declined to prosecute, it is unclear 
whether the Council would still reap the benefit of having made a 
referral and be able to absolve itself of its responsibility for maintain-
ing peace and security. Faced with a refusal from the ICC, might the 
Council be catalyzed to respond to non-complying States Parties in 
the ongoing investigations?  
 Readers might recall the backlash sparked by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ)’s227 refusal to decide the South West Africa cas-
es in 1962 and 1966. African States’ confidence in the ICJ was nearly 
irrevocably destroyed when the ICJ dismissed, on technical grounds, 
the South West Africa cases,228 Ethiopia and Liberia’s challenge to 
South Africa’s occupation of South West Africa. It was the ICJ’s deci-
sion not to decide that created this backlash, and confidence in the 
ICJ was not restored until 1971 in the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in 
the Namibia case.229   
 Deciding not to prosecute would indeed be a controversial decision 
for the Prosecutor to make, but the Prosecutor has already twice said 
yes to the Council when it has made referrals, even when the Council 
created added constraints within those referrals. The results, as this 
Article has argued, have been at best mixed, and even unhelpful to 
the Court. Unlike in the South West Africa cases, the Prosecutor’s 
decision not to investigate the Council-referred situation in the inter-
ests of justice should happen quickly, not over the course of many 
years, as occurred with the ICJ decision (not to decide).  
                                                                                                                  
 226. A number of audiences will be affected by Prosecutorial decisions. The Prosecu-
tor’s declination will have effects on: (1) victims in the particular conflict situation; (2) 
members of the Council, particularly those who are also States Parties; (3) States Parties 
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 In addition, parties before the ICJ conceded to submit to its juris-
diction, so its refusal to hear their case creates a unique, unfulfilled 
mandate. Although the Rome Statute provides the legal power for the 
Court to investigate and prosecute in Council-referred cases, these 
cases have been in States that have not consented to the Court’s ju-
risdiction. In addition, the Council has not supported this power in 
the ways the Rome Statute contemplated,230 and the Court is in jeop-
ardy, so ensuring that the Prosecutor can sufficiently investigate is 
critical. After the disintegration of the last Kenyan cases against Ru-
to and Sang in April 2016231 and the most recent withdrawals of 
Gambia,232 South Africa, and Burundi233 from the ICC, the Prosecutor 
should attempt to shore up perceptions of the ICC’s fairness and ef-
fectiveness, by considering steps to ensure that its next cases are 
manageable and effectively prosecuted. Specifically, the Prosecutor 
might seek to distance her Office from claims of selective justice by 
declining to pursue a future Council referral and submitting that de-
cision to the Pre-Trial Chamber for review.  
 One additional danger of denying a Council referral in the inter-
ests of justice is the possibility of alienating the permanent Council 
members and States Parties the United Kingdom and France, as well 
as supporters of the ICC, and States that likely would have worked to 
galvanize the Council’s political will to refer to the ICC. The United 
Kingdom and France, along with other European States Parties, are 
responsible for a significant portion of the ICC’s funding, and may be 
displeased with prosecutorial declination in the short-term. The big-
gest funder of enforcement in the ad hoc tribunals was the United 
States, and the United States has continued to push for ad hoc tribu-
nals, even in the wake of the Rome framework. While a more attenu-
ated possibility, the Prosecutor declining to investigate or to prose-
cute may well motivate Council members to establish an ad hoc tri-
bunal for situations involving non-State Parties to the Statute, which 
might in turn ensure that there is prosecution of the crimes. At the 
dawn of the Rome Statute, supporters of the Court hoped future ad 
hoc tribunals would not be necessary, but at present, given the politi-
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 231. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Ruto and Sang Case: ICC Trial 
Chamber V(A) Terminates the Case Without Prejudice to Re-Prosecution  
in Future, Press Release ICC-CPI-20160405-PR1205 (Apr. 5, 2016),  
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1205&ln=en [https://perma.cc/JD89-6573].  
 232. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Gambia: Withdrawal, 
C.N.862.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Nov. 10, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
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cal impasse of the Council, it appears some gaps in the jurisdiction of 
the ICC may well be filled in this way.  
 Were the PTC to endorse the Prosecutor’s decision to decline to 
prosecute, the relatively low cost to the Council of future referrals 
might be raised. This might require Council members to consider in 
advance how they might consistently support the referrals.234 It is 
possible that the Council might also, within its existing constraints, 
be incentivized to find ways to support its existing referrals.235  
 In order for international criminal law norms to be strengthened, 
the ICC could focus its efforts on situations in States Parties that 
claim to share a stated legal commitment to international criminal 
law norms by virtue of their ratification of the Rome Statute, which 
is not to say that the Prosecutor will not face obstacles in such situa-
tions as well. Eventually, the Prosecutor may expand her declination 
to other forms of referrals.  
 What are some theoretical implications of prosecutorial declina-
tion? Prosecutorial declination belies the view that international law 
is a system and that the Prosecutor must not use her discretion to 
decline to investigate or prosecute Council referrals, because the ICC 
is a security court in such instances. Viewing the prosecutor as em-
powered to decline Council referrals accepts that seats of authority in 
the international sphere are increasingly pluralistic. Indeed, it as-
sumes that contests of authority at the international level may con-
tribute to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ICC. Zeroing in on 
the possibility of conflicts between Council determinations and ICC 
decisions provides the underpinnings of an argument for a form of 
complementarity at the international level, one that places the ICC 
in a possibly superior position to the Council in regards to interna-
tional criminal law. Increasing fragmentation at the international 
level opens space both for contestation of authority and specializa-
tion, and opens the possibility of multiple seats of legitimacy. Prose-
cutorial declination of Council referrals may thus serve as a correc-
tive to the theoretical understanding that the UN Charter is the core 
                                                                                                                  
 234. Given the political nature of the UN Security Council’s actions, consistent support 
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constitutional document of an international system, and the UN Se-
curity Council, with its power to bind Member States, sits at the apex 
of this system.    
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 The primary goals of this Article have been, first, to explore a path 
not yet taken by the Prosecutor in the relationship between the ICC 
and the powerful Security Council as a means for increasing the 
effectiveness and States Parties’ perceptions of the fairness of the 
ICC. Given the power of individual Council members, the 
enforcement power of the Council, and the relative lack of power of 
the Prosecutor of the ICC, the relationship between the Court and 
the Council is also useful for interrogating the point at which 
constructivist approaches can be used to leverage change in a 
rational-choice-based relationship. While the Prosecutor arguably 
does not require enforcement mechanisms to promote norms against 
impunity (indeed, some studies indicate enforcement of human rights 
norms, for example, may sometimes create backlash),236 the limits of 
constructivist approaches to norm diffusion may be reached when 
there is active undermining of those norms by the same powerful 
institutions, institutions like the Council, that should be enforcing 
and applying the norms. This analysis has demonstrated that 
although the goals of international criminal justice are complex, the 
relationship with the Council is not only ripe for change, the 
Prosecutor has some power to alter it.   
 For States Parties, the Prosecutor has the potential to be a more 
accountable and normatively valid source of international criminal 
law norms than is the Council. It may well be that the mandates of 
both the ICC and the Council will be better served by the Prosecutor 
declining to prosecute Council-referred cases in the short-term.  
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